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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
VAL M. ELLISON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 20080145-CA
UTAH COUNTY GOVERNMENT, and
HARTFORD LIFE & ACCIDENT
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has pour-over jurisdiction under section 78 A-4-103(2)(j) of the Utah Code.
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction under section 78A-3-102(3)(j) of the Utah Code.
The order appealed from was entered January 23, 2008.l The plaintiff-appellant filed his
Notice of Appeal on February 8, 2008, which was timely under rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.

l

R. 647-657.
1

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Was summary judgment precluded by genuine issues of material fact? "An

appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of
summary judgment for correctness, and views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."2
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
There are not any specific constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or
regulations whose interpretation alone is determinative of this appeal or of central importance
to it.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from a final order of dismissal entered on summary judgment in a
civil case.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below,

The plaintiff-appellant, Val M. Ellison, filed his complaint on June 30, 2005.3
Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Co. ("Hartford), a defendant-appellee, filed a motion

2

Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^ 6 , 177 P.3d 600 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
3

R.2-12.
2

for summary judgment on December 1, 2006.4 Later, Utah County Government ("the
County), also a defendant-appellee, filed a motion for summary judgment on January 26,
2007.5 Mr. Ellison filed a response to Hartford's motion on January 5, 2007,6 and a response
to the County's motion on March 27, 2007.7
Oral arguments on the defendants' motions were held July 20, 2007.8 At the
conclusion of oral arguments, the trial court ruled from the bench in favor of the defendants.9
Soon thereafter, Hartford prepared and filed a proposed order granting the defendants'
motions for summary judgment, and Mr. Ellison filed a written objection to it on October 4,
2007.10 In a minute entry dated January 22, 2008, the trial court acknowledged that
Hartford's proposed order "does, indeed, extend substantially beyond the rationale and
findings expressed by the Court at the time of the hearing."1l Nevertheless, after deleting only
part of a single paragraph of the proposed order, the trial court went ahead and caused

4

R. 73-76.

5

R. 502-504.

6

R. 416-435.

7

R. 539-612

8

R. 641-644.

9

R. 644.

10

R. 645-657.

u

For some reason, this Minute Entry does not appear in the record. Mr. Ellison is in
the process of filing a motion to correct this error in the record.
3

Hartford's proposed order to be entered anyway on January 23,2008.12 On February 8,2008,
Mr. Ellison filed a Notice of Appeal.13
C.

Statement of Facts.

Because this appeal asserts that there are disputed issues of material fact, such facts
are discussed in greater detail in the argument section of this brief. The following, however,
is a brief overview of the relevant facts.
Val Ellison entered into an employment contract with the County, pursuant to which
he began working for the County in July 1995.14 As part of this employment contract, the
County agreed to provide life insurance for Mr. Ellison and supplemental life-insurance
coverage for his dependents.15 Sometime thereafter, Mr. Ellison purchased a supplemental
life-insurance policy on his wife, Sherrie Ellison, through Hartford ("the Policy").16 Neither
the County or Hartford ever provided Mr. Ellison or his wife with a copy of the Policy.17

l2

R. 647-657.

13

SeeR. 658-659.

14

R. 408, 598, 606.

15

R. 408, 598, 605.

16

R. 408, 431, 598, 605.

17

R. 555-556, 595.
4

Among other things, the Policy states that the County's "responsibilities include:...
Notifying employees of their right to exercise the Conversion Privilege" in situations where,
for example, a dependent may be excluded from coverage under the Policy by divorce.18
Although Mr. Ellison and his wife eventually divorced, they had "an agreement" that
the Policy would be used to "help the kids with education and things like that."19 Mr.
Ellison's wife specially told him "to use the insurance to help the kids with missions and
schooling and so forth."20 Due to the existence of this agreement, neither Mr. Ellison or his
wife thought it was necessary to subsequently address the Policy in their divorce decree.21
Given the fact that Mr. Ellison and his wife were preparing for divorce, as well as the
fact that Mr. Ellison's wife suffered from terminal cancer, Mr. Ellison contacted the County' s
human-resource department to learn what he needed to do to maintain the Policy after
divorce.22 An unidentified representative from the County' s human-resource department told
Mr. Ellison that he only needed to "continue to make the premium payments in order to
continue life insurance coverage."23 This County representative did not tell Mr. Ellison that

18

R. 406-407, 542, 595.

19

R. 323, 431, 597.

20

R. 287, 431, 548, 597.

21

R. 287,431,548, 597.

22

R. 271-272, 276-277, 282, 405, 597, 604-605.

23

R. 271, 276-277, 320, 404-405, 558, 597.
5

he needed to fill out any additional paperwork or take any further action to ensure coverage
after divorce.24
During this conversation with the County representative in question, Mr. Ellison asked
for "something in writing" to confirm what the representative had told him.25 In response, the
representative gave Mr. Ellison Hartford's telephone number and told him to call it to obtain
the written confirmation he desired.26 Consequently, on January 30, 2003, Mr. Ellison
contacted Hartford by telephone at the number the County representative had given to him.27
During Mr. Ellison's telephone call to Hartford, he spoke with Hartford employee
Linda Daly.28 Mr. Ellison told Ms. Daly that the County "told me that you can continue
insurance on your spouse even if you get divorced."29 Ms. Daly confirmed the County's
representations regarding the Policy and said, "[Y]es. . . . I think that's your option if you
want to and you continue t o . . . they're going to be payroll deducting for her[,] so if you want
to keep her on there, that's fine."30 Ms. Daly did not, however, ever tell Mr. Ellison that he

24

R. 271, 276-277, 363-364, 405, 431, 558, 597, 603.

25

R. 430, 573, 597, 603.

26

R. 405, 430, 573-574, 597, 603.

27

R. 430, 553, 552, 596.

28R. 404, 430, 573-574, 596.
29

R. 430, 573-574, 596.

30

R. 320, 336, 430, 573-574, 596.

needed to fill out any additional paperwork or take any further action in order to ensure
coverage after divorce.31
As Mr. Ellison's conversation with Ms. Daly came to a close, Ms. Daly told Mr.
Ellison that she would transfer his call to a different Hartford employee so that he could
obtain any additional verification that he might desire.32 As a result, Mr. Ellison then spoke
with a second, albeit unidentified, Hartford employee about the continuation of the Policy
following divorce.33 This Hartford employee also told Mr. Ellison that the only thing he
needed to do to continue coverage under the Policy after his divorce was to continue paying
the required premiums.34 Whether Mr. Ellison's conversation with this second Hartford
employee was recorded is unknown, but Mr. Ellison has not been given a copy of any such
recording.35
Due to the multiple representations that the defendants' employees made to Mr.
Ellison about the continuation of the Policy following divorce, Mr. Ellison simply continued
to pay the Policy premiums following his divorce.36 He did not complete any additional

31

R. 331,430, 573-574.

32

R. 335, 573-574.

33

R. 334-335, 337, 430.

34

R. 334, 430.

35

R. 403.

36

R. 296-297, 333.
7

paperwork or take any further action.37 Instead, he simply followed the County and Hartford
employees' instructions: i.e., he just continued to pay the premiums.3*
Mr. Ellison's divorce was finalized on August 219 2003.39 Soon thereafter, on October
27,2003, his former wife, Sherrie Ellison, passed away following a long bout with cancer.40
However, during the period of time between their divorce and Ms. Ellison's subsequent
death, the County continued to deduct from Mr. Ellison's income to pay the premiums on the
Policy, and Hartford continued to accept these payments.41 Nevertheless, when Mr. Ellison
later filed a claim for benefits under the Policy as a result of Ms. Ellison's passing, the
defendants denied his claim and refused to honor either the Policy or the multiple
representations that they had made to him about the Policy.42 The defendants' stated reason
for denying Mr. Ellison's claim was that neither he or Ms. Ellison ever completed the
necessary steps to have the Policy "converted" after their divorce.43

37

R. 333.

38

R. 296-298, 333.

39

R. 405, 605.

40

R. 405, 604-605.

41

R. 296-297.

42

R.402,601.

43

R. 300-301,401-402,598.
8

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case is about whether or not the trial court erred by granting the defendants'
motions for summary judgment when there are genuine issues of material fact. For example,
there are disputed issues of material fact as to whether the defendants made
misrepresentations, either knowingly or recklessly, to Mr. Ellison upon which he reasonably
relied to his detriment. There are disputed issues of material fact as to whether the defendants
acted unfairly and in bad faith in various respects. And there are disputed issues of material
fact as to whether Mr. Ellison's conduct was reasonable under the circumstances.
It is Mr. Ellison's contention that, by either discrediting or disregarding the admissible
evidence giving rise to these disputed material facts, and by otherwise ignoring various
reasonable inferences in Mr. Ellison's favor, the trial court erred. Consequently, the trial
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants should be reversed, and this matter
should be remanded so that the parties may continue to prepare for trial.
ARGUMENT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PRECLUDED
BY GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
The defendants' motions for summary judgment should have been denied because
there were genuine issues of material fact. "A summary judgment movant must show both
that there is no material issue of fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

9

of law.'

Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.5'45 The "facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom" must be
viewed "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."46 Indeed, even where the parties
are "not in complete conflict as to certain facts," but "the understanding, intention, and
consequences of those facts [are] vigorously disputed," the matter is not proper for summary
judgment and "can only be resolved by a trial."47
Given that there are disputed issues of material fact in this case, it was improper for
the trial court to grant the defendants' motions for summary judgment.
L

THERE IS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF MISREPRESENTATIONS THAT
CREATE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT.
In anticipation of his divorce, Mr. Ellison acted with reasonable diligence to determine

whether and how coverage under the Policy might be affected in the event of divorce.
Because neither of the defendants had ever provided Mr. Ellison with a copy of the Policy,
he contacted at least one County employee and two Hartford employees in order to make this

^Orvis v. Johnson. 2008 UT 2, f 12, 177 P.3d 600.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
'Orvis, 2008 UT 2, ^ 6.
Sandberg v. Klein. 576 P.2d 1291, 1292 (Utah 1978).
10

determination.48 All three of these individuals, in succession and without exception, informed
Mr. Ellison that his anticipated divorce would in no way affect coverage if he simply
continued to pay the premiums.49 None of these three individuals told Mr. Ellison that he
needed to take additional action, beyond simply paying the premiums, to secure coverage.^0
In reliance upon these representations, Mr. Ellison stopped investigating the matter any
further and instead simply continued to pay the necessary premiums, as he had been
advised.51 Nevertheless, when he subsequently filed a claim for benefits under the Policy, his
claim was denied because he had failed, according to the defendants, to properly "convert"
his Policy at the time of divorce.52
Due to the defendants5 failure to honor Mr. Ellison's insurance claim, Mr. Ellison
filed the present lawsuit against them, alleging fraud, estoppel, negligence, breach of
contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.53 In opposition to this
lawsuit, the defendants filed motions for summary judgment seeking to have this matter

48

R. 271-272,276-277,282,334-335,337,404-405,430,573-574,596-597,604-605.

49

R. 271, 276-277, 320, 331, 334, 336, 363-364, 404-405, 430-431, 558, 573-574,
596-597, 603.
50

R. 271, 276-277, 331, 363-364, 405, 430-431, 558, 573-574, 597, 603.

5l

R. 296-298, 333.

52

R. 300-301, 401-402, 598, 601.

53

R.2-12.
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dismissed with prejudice.54 The trial court granted both of these motions in favor of the
defendants.55 One of the main reasons why the trial court granted these motions was because,
in the court's opinion, there was no admissible evidence that Mr. Ellison had a conversation
with any County or Hartford employee (other than with Linda Daly) regarding continuation
of the Policy after divorce.56 This opinion, however, is incorrect. In particular, Mr. Ellison
has presented admissible evidence of representations that the defendants' employees made
to him about the continuation of the Policy after divorce, and, as explained below, this
evidence creates genuine issues of material fact.
A.

Credibility.

Mr. Ellison presented evidence to the trial court of conversations he had with (1) at
least one unidentified County employee from the County's human-resource department; (2)
Linda Daly, a Hartford employee; and (3) another, albeit unidentified, Hartford employee.
The trial court purported to make findings of fact with respect to this evidence and found that

^R. 73-76, 502-504.
;

R. 641-644.

TL 648, 651.
12

it was not either "credible"57 or "reliable."58 Concerns over the credibility of evidence,
however, are issues of fact that should only be resolved at trial—nothy summary judgment.^9
Regarding the credibility of the evidence Mr. Ellison presented about his conversation
with a representative of the County's human-resource department and with the unidentified
Hartford representative, the trial court apparently discredited and disregarded this evidence
because, according to the trial court, the evidence is "self-serving."60 But, self-serving or not,
credibility is a question of fact that should be reserved for trial.61 "The fact finder may or may
not find such self-serving testimony credible."62 The decision belongs to the fact finder.63 It
was, therefore, improper to decide these credibility issues on summary judgment.
B.

Reasonable Inferences.

Not only is the credibility of evidence an issue of fact that should be decided at trial,
but to the extent any inferences reasonably arising out of such evidence create disputed issues

57

Transcript, at 60.

58

R. 7.

59

van der Hevde v. First Colony Life Ins. Co.. 845 P.2d 275, 280 (Utah Ct. App.

1993).
60

Transcript, at 61.

61

Larsen v. Exclusive Cars. Inc.. 2004 UT App. 259, f 11 n.2, 297 P.3d 714.

62

van der Hevde. 845 P.2d at 280.

63

IcL
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of material fact, then summary judgment should be denied.64 In the present case, there are
various reasonable inferences which, viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Ellison, create
genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Many of such
inferences are a product of Mr. Ellison's recorded and subsequently-transcribed telephone
conversation with Hartford employee Linda Daly.65
Given that Mr. Ellison's telephone conversation with Ms. Daly was recorded, the fact
that Mr. Ellison had a telephone conversation with Ms. Daly about the Policy is undisputed.66
The admissibility of the transcript of this conversation is also undisputed.67 What is disputed,
however, is the interpretation and meaning of this conversation, as well as any inferences
arising therefrom. This dispute is, alone, a sufficient basis for reversing the trial court's grant
of summary judgment for the defendants.
During their telephone conversation, Mr. Ellison informed Ms. Daly that he had
obtained her telephone number from the County, that the County had told him that he only
needed to continue paying the premiums to maintain coverage, and that he wanted
verification from Hartford confirming the County's representations.68 Ms. Daly affirmed the

64

Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, If 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
65

R. 573-574.

<*R. 404, 430, 573-574, 596; Transcript, at 51:10-12.
67

Transcript, at 51:11-12.

68

R. 573-574.
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County's representations and stated: u[Y]es. . . . I think that's your option if you want to
[continue coverage after divorce;] when you continue to, they are going to be payroll
deducting for [Sherrie Ellison], so if you want to keep her on there, that's fine."69
As Mr. Ellison's conversation with Ms. Daly came to a close, Ms. Daly told Mr.
Ellison that, if he wished, she would have his call transferred to a second Hartford employee
so that he could obtain any additional verification that he might desire.70 Consequently, Mr.
Ellison's call was transferred to a different Hartford employee.71 According to Mr. Ellison's
sworn testimony, this second Hartford employee again confirmed that the Policy would not
be affected by divorce so long as the premiums were paid.72
This telephone conversation between Mr. Ellison and Ms. Daly creates various
reasonable inferences which, when viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Ellison as the
nonmoving party, create genuine issues of material fact that should have been preserved for
trial, such as the following:
First, given that Mr. Ellison obtained Ms. Daly's telephone number from the County,
it' may be reasonably inferred that Mr. Ellison did in fact speak with the County
representative that gave him Ms. Daly's number. This inference tends to corroborate Mr.

69

R. 320, 336, 430, 573-574, 596.

70

R. 335, 573-574.

71

R. 334-335, 337,430.

72

R. 334, 430.
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Ellison's testimony that he spoke with a representative of the County's human-resource
department, and that this representative told Mr. Ellison that he did not need to do anything
except continue to pay the premiums in order to maintain coverage following divorce.
Second, given that Ms. Daly told Mr. Ellison that she would transfer his call to a
different Hartford employee so that he could obtain any additional assurances that he might
desire, it can be reasonably inferred that Mr. Ellison's call was in fact transferred to a
different Hartford employee. It can also be reasonably inferred that Mr. Ellison spoke with
this second Hartford employee about the Policy. These reasonable inferences, when viewed
in the light most favorable to Mr. Ellison, corroborate Mr. Ellison's testimony that he spoke
with a second Hartford employee, and that this employee agreed with the representations that
had been previously made to him concerning continuation of the Policy.
Third, given that, after speaking with the defendants' employees, Mr. Ellison
apparently took no action (other than to continue paying the premiums) to secure coverage
under the Policy, it can be reasonably inferred that these employees did in fact tell Mr.
Ellison that he only needed to continue to pay the premiums to maintain coverage. Among
other things, this inference creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Ellison
reasonably relied upon the representations that the defendants' employees made to him.

16

These reasonable inferences, and the facts giving rise to them, when viewed in the
light most favorable to Mr. Ellison, create genuine issues of material fact that should have
been preserved for trial.73
C

Admissibility.

As has already been noted, the evidence of Mr. Ellison's telephone call with Ms. Daly
is undisputed. Whether the evidence of Mr. Ellison's conversation with the representative of
the County's human-resource department is admissible, however, is disputed, as is also the
evidence of Mr. Ellison's conversation with the unidentified Hartford employee to whom Ms.
Daly transferred his call.74 The trial court apparently believed such evidence was
inadmissible hearsay, and therefore did not consider it, because the identities of these two
employees are unknown.75 Although the identities of these employees may be unknown,
however, does not mean that the evidence in question must be inadmissible hearsay.
First, this evidence is not hearsay because it is not being "offered... to prove the truth
of the matter asserted";76 that is, it is not being offered to prove that the statements made to
Mr. Ellison were true. Indeed, this case arises because "the matter asserted" is false. Rather,
the statements were offered merely to show that the defendants did in fact make

'Orvis, 2008 UT 2, \ 6.
^R. 648, 651.
Transcript, at 36-37, 50-52. See Utah R. Evid. 801(c).
Id
17

representations to Mr. Ellison upon which he reasonably relied to his detriment. By
definition, this evidence is not hearsay.77
Second, this evidence cannot be hearsay because any statement in it "is offered against
a party and is . . . the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative
capacity."78 As the defendants' agents, having at least apparent authority from their
respective principals, the unidentified County and Hartford employees acted for their
principals, thereby binding the defendants, when they made the representations at issue to
Mr. Ellison.79 As a result, such statements are not hearsay because they constitute admissions
by a party-opponent.80
Third, the hearsay rule does not exclude this evidence because it is composed of
"statements against interest."81 A statement may be excepted from the hearsay rule if, "at the
time of its making," it was
so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid
a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the

78

Id 801(d)(2).

79

See Farrington v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co.. 232 P.2d 754, 757 (Utah 1951); see
also S. W. Bridges & Co. v. Candland. 54 P.2d 842, 848 (Utah 1936); Vadner v. Rozzelle,
45 P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1935).
80

Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2).

81

Id 804(b)(3).
18

declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to
be true.82
The statements were against the declarant's interest because, if true, they would subject the
defendants to liability for insurance benefits for Mr. Ellison's wife. A reasonable person in
the position of the defendants' employees would not have made such statements unless they
believed them to be true. The statements, therefore, are not inadmissible hearsay, and the trial
court should have considered such evidence.
II.

THE MISREPRESENTATIONS
MATERIAL FACTS,

CONCERN PRESENTLY EXISTING

The misrepresentations that the defendants' employees made to Mr. Ellison concerned
facts then in existence. The misrepresentations were about whether the Policy, at that specific
moment in time, provided that coverage for dependents continued, even after divorce, so long
as the premiums continued to be paid. In other words, the misrepresentations concerned the
provisions and procedures of the Policy in their then-existing form. As such, the
misrepresentations concerned material facts which were then in existence. Indeed, even the
trial court and opposing counsel recognized the plausibility and reasonableness of this
inference during oral arguments.83 Consequently, given that all reasonable inferences should
be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, this inference should have

Transcript, at 22:7-14.
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been made, and, as a result, the defendants' motions for summary judgment should have been
denied.84
III.

WHETHER THE MISREPRESENTATIONS WERE MADE KNOWINGLY
OR RECKLESSLY IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT.
Liability for fraud can be found where a misrepresentation is made either knowingly

or recklessly.85 Whether a person made a misrepresentation knowingly or recklessly,
however, is a question of fact.86 Indeed, fraud may exist even where a party "knew nothing
about the matter and . . . recklessly affirm[ed] as a fact something of which [he was] entirely
ignorant."87 Nevertheless, the trial court dismissed Mr. Ellison's fraud claims because,
according to the trial court, "no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the transcript of
the recording of the Daly call manifests an intent by Ms. Daly to deceive or misrepresent a
fact."88 The trial court's dismissal of Mr. Ellison's fraud claims on this basis is improper for

84

0rvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^f 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
85

Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 2001 UT 25, Tf 33, 21
P.3d 198.
86

State v. Barzee, 2007 UT 95, lj 81, 177 P.3d 48 ("Issues such as reasonableness,
knowledge, and proximate cause are fact questions to be resolved by the fact finder . . . . " ) .
87

Stuck v. Delta Land & Water Co.. 227 P. 791, 804 (Utah 1924).

88

R. 650.
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at least the following reasons:
First, as already noted, whether a person makes a misrepresentation knowingly or
recklessly, is a question of fact.89 The trial court, therefore, should not have made factual
findings regarding this issue at the summary-judgment stage.
Second, as has also already been noted, fraud can be found where a misrepresentation
is made either knowingly or recklessly.90 Even though a person may not have knowingly
made a misrepresentation, that person can still be liable for fraud if she did it recklessly.91 It
was, therefore, error for the trial court to dismiss Mr. Ellison's fraud claims simply because
the trial court did not find a "knowing" misrepresentation;92 the trial court should have also
considered whether there was a "reckless" misrepresentation.93
And, third, simply because Ms. Daly may not have made a misrepresentation either
knowingly or recklessly does not mean that the other Hartford employee Mr. Ellison spoke
with was similarly innocent. Nor does it mean that the County employee Mr. Ellison spoke
with was innocent. In other words, the trial court erred by dismissing Mr. Ellison's fraud

'State v. Barzee. 2007 UT 95, % 81.
'Franco, 2001 UT 25,133.
Id
'R. 650.
Franco, 2001 UT 25,^33.
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claims against the defendants simply because one of the three individuals who made
misrepresentations to Mr. Ellison may not have done so knowingly.
IV.

WHETHER MR. ELLISON ACTED WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE AND
REASONABLY RELIED UPON THE MISREPRESENTATIONS IS A
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT.
Despite the evidence of the defendants' misrepresentations, the trial court dismissed

all of Mr. Ellison's claims because it did not believe that Mr. Ellison acted with reasonable
diligence or that he reasonably relied upon the representations made to him.94 In particular,
the trial court dismissed Mr. Ellison's negligence claim against the County because,
according to the court, Mr. Ellison did not act with reasonable diligence to determine the
Policy's provisions and procedures.95 Likewise, the trial court dismissed Mr. Ellison's fraud
and estoppel claims because the court did not consider Mr. Ellison's reliance upon the
defendants' misrepresentations as having been reasonable.96
Whether Mr. Ellison acted with reasonable diligence and reasonably relied upon the
representations that the defendants made to him, however, is a genuine issue of material fact
that should have been preserved for trial. As a result, the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendants was in error.

'R. 647-651.
!

R. 647-648.

ft. 648-651.
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A,

Reasonable Diligence.

In Utah, reasonableness must generally "be considered with reference to the facts of
each case, and is usually a question for the jury to determine."97 Despite this principle, the
trial court dismissed Mr. Ellison's negligence claim against the County because, in the
court's opinion, Mr. Ellison failed to act with reasonable diligence to "inform[] himself
regarding the Policy's provisions and procedures."98 But this conclusion, when considered
"with reference to the facts," is erroneous because it is premised upon disputed issues of
material fact.99
The evidence before the trial court showed, among other things, that the County never
provided Mr. Ellison with a copy of the Policy.100 Likewise, the County never notified Mr.
Ellison of his "right to exercise the Conversion Privilege," despite the County's contractual
duty to do so. When, however, Mr. Ellison later tried to inform himself of the Policy's
provisions and procedures by contacting the County's human-resource department, at least
one representative from that department provided Mr. Ellison with incorrect information
about the Policy. Based upon this incorrect information, as well as the incorrect information

97

Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs.. 739 P.2d 634, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
(emphases added) see EDSA/Cloward LLC v. Klibanoff. 2005 UT App. 367, % 21,122 P.3d
646.
98

R. 647-648.

"Conder, 739 P.2d at 638.
100

R. 555-556, 595.
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that he subsequently received from Hartford, Mr. Ellison reasonably believed that no
additional action was required to maintain coverage so long as he continued to pay the
premiums. As a result, he simply continued to pay the premiums, believing all the while that
he was in strict compliance with the Policy's provisions and procedures.
When viewing these facts, and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom, in the light
most favorable to Mr. Ellison, the question as to whether Mr. Ellison acted with reasonable
diligence to determine the Policy's provisions and procedures becomes a genuine issue of
material fact, which should be preserved for trial. In any event, the trial court should have
refrained from dismissing Mr. Ellison's negligence claim because, "[a]s a general
proposition, summary judgment is inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its merits,
and should be employed 'only in the most clear-cut case.'"101 Indeed, "[o]rdinarily the
question of negligence . . . may not be settled on a motion for summary judgment."102
"[S]ummary judgment is rarely an appropriate remedy for resolving negligence actions."103
For these additional reasons, Mr. Ellison's negligence claim should also have never been
dismissed.

101

Wvcalis v. Guardian Title. 780 P.2d 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted).

102

Preston v. Lamb. 436 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1968); see Butler v. Sports Haven
Int'l 563 P.2d 1245, 1246 (Utah 1977).
103

Williams v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723, 728 (Utah 1985).
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B.

Reasonable Reliance.

Likewise, Mr. Ellison's other claims, such as those for fraud and estoppel, were not
properly subject to dismissal on summary judgment because whether Mr. Ellison reasonably
relied upon the defendants' misrepresentations is a disputed issue of material fact.l04Based
upon language from Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Co.,1(b however, the trial court
determined otherwise.106 This determination was incorrect.
Perkins involved a situation where an insured made material misrepresentations in her
life-insurance application.107 After the insured died, and her misrepresentations were
discovered, the insurer refused to honor the insurance policy that it had previously issued on
the insured's life, even though the insurer had collected premiums from the insured in
connection with the policy.108 The insured's husband sued the insurer, claiming that the
insurer should be estopped from voiding the policy because the insurer had collected
premiums from the insured in connection with the policy.109 The Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal of the husband's estoppel claim because his wife "had the means by

104

EDSA/Cloward LLC, 2005 UT App. 367, f 21.

105

Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Co.. 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

106

Transcript, at 62:19 to 63:4.
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Perkms, 814 P.2d at 1127-28.
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IcL

109

Id at 1130-31.
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which she could have ascertained the contents of [the] policy," but she did not put forth any
effort "to learn the terms of her insurance policy."110 Consequently, the court declared that
"her reliance . . . was not reasonable."111
Perkins is readily distinguishable from the facts at issue in the present case. First,
unlike Perkins, there are no allegations that the insured (Mr. Ellison) made any
misrepresentations to his insurer (the defendants) at the time the policy was issued. Second,
unlike Perkins, there is evidence that the insurer (the defendants) made misrepresentations
to the insured (Mr. Ellison) about the policy. Third, unlike Perkins, there is evidence that the
misrepresentations that were made to the insured were about the perpetuation of the policy:
they were not mere misrepresentations about the Policy's contents, but they were instead
affirmative misrepresentations about what Mr. Ellison needed to do to perpetuate coverage
prospectively. Fourth, unlike Perkins, there is evidence that the insured actually put forth
effort to try to discover the policy's provisions and procedures: in fact, the evidence shows
that Mr. Ellison made multiple attempts to obtain information about the Policy from the
defendants. Fifth, unlike Perkins, the estoppel claim in the present matter is not based solely
on the insurer's acceptance of the premiums: although Hartford's acceptance of the
premiums is relevant, the primary basis of Mr. Ellison's estoppel claim is that the defendants
made multiple misrepresentations to him upon which he reasonably relied to his detriment.

110

Idatll31.

111

Idi
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And, sixth, unlike Perkins, Mr. Ellison has not only brought an estoppel claim against the
defendants, but a fraud claim as well: Perkins only dealt with estoppel; it did not address
fraud. Consequently, Perkins does not apply to the facts at issue in this case.
In any event, the trial court failed to properly consider the Youngblood line of cases.l

n

(Youngblood II was decided after briefing had been completed but before oral arguments in
this case. Mr. Ellison provided the trial court with a copy of Youngblood II during oral
arguments.113) The Youngblood cases arose out of a situation where an insurer made
misrepresentations about the scope of an insurance policy, thereby inducing the plaintiff to
purchase the policy.114 These misrepresentations were made before the plaintiff actually
purchased the policy.115 When the plaintiff was subsequently injured, however, he discovered
that his injury was not actually covered by his policy, even though the insurer had made
representations to him to the contrary at the time of purchase.116 As a result, the plaintiff sued
his insurer, alleging, among other things, estoppel.117 Although the trial court dismissed the

112

See Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.. 2005 UT App. 154, 111 P.3d 829
[hereinafter Youngblood I]; Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.. 2007 UT 28, 158 P.3d
1088 [hereinafter Youngblood II].
113
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plaintiffs estoppel claim by summary judgment, the appellate courts in Youngblood I and
Youngblood II eventually reversed the trial court's decision.118
In Youngblood II, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "the question of whether or not"
an insured's "reliance on [an] agent's misrepresentations of the scope of coverage under [an
insurance] policy [is] reasonable ...is one of fact"119 Consequently, the Youngblood II court
held that "[rjeliance upon an agent's material misrepresentations regarding coverage may or
may not be reasonable, depending upon the facts of the individual case."120 This holding is
consistent with the Youngblood I court's previously-issued opinion: "'Reasonable reliance
must be considered with reference to the facts of each case, and is usually a question for the
jury to determine.'"121 For this reason, the court in Youngblood I also concluded that, "based
on [the plaintiffs] deposition testimony and affidavit, there [was] again at least a disputed
issue of material fact as to whether [the plaintiff] reasonably relied on the representations
made by [the insurance] agent."122
Although the misrepresentations that the defendants made to Mr. Ellison were made
after the Policy was issued, rather than before Mr. Ellison purchased it, these

ll8

I4 \ 11; Youngblood IL 2007 UT 28, \ 2.

119

YoungbloodIl, 2007 UT28, \ 38 (emphasis added).

120

Id. \ 35 (emphasis added).

121

Youngblood L 2005 UT App. 154, \ 23 (quoting Conder, 739 P.2d at 638)
(emphases added).
122

kLt26.
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misrepresentations concerned the continued perpetuation and preservation of the Policy. As
such, they are similar to those made to the plaintiff in the Youngblood cases, in that the
misrepresentations in question were made in order to persuade Mr. Ellison to make additional
payttients toward the Policy. In other words, these misrepresentations were made before Mr.
Ellison got divorced and before he paid any premiums on the Policy as a newly-divorced
individual. They were also made before Mr. Ellison concluded that he had successfully
maintained coverage under the Policy following his divorce.
Like the plaintiff in the Youngblood cases, Mr. Ellison has provided sworn testimony
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he acted in reasonable
reliance upon the misrepresentations that were made to him during his conversations with
defendants' employees. Indeed, the trial court has itself recognized that "Mr. Ellison's
understanding of the existence ofthose conversations might be relevant to the reasonableness
of his conduct."123 Consequently, the trial court's complete reliance upon the Policy's express
language was improper, inasmuch as there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether
Mr. Ellison reasonably relied upon the defendants' misrepresentations, and all inferences
should be construed in Mr. Ellison's favor.124
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Transcript, at 61:3-5.
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See Larsen v. Exclusive Cars. Inc., 2004 UT App. 259,1fl[ 10-11, 297 P.3d 714
("The trial court erred when it looked chiefly to the sales documents to determine that [the
plaintiffs] reliance on [the defendant's] oral representations was unreasonable as a matter
of law. . . . Viewing the totality of the alleged facts in the light most favorable to [the
plaintiff], a jury could find that he acted reasonably.").
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V,

WHETHER MR. ELLISON SUFFERED DAMAGES IS A GENUINE ISSUE
OF MATERIAL FACT.
The trial court dismissed all of Mr. Ellison's claims because it did not believe that Mr.

Ellison had suffered any damages.125 In the court's own words:
There is no admissible evidence from which the fact-finder can reasonably
infer that Sherrie Ellison would have converted her group insurance policy into
an individual policy, and there is no evidence that Mr. Ellison, rather than
Sherrie Ellison's estate or heirs, would have been the beneficiaries of that
conversion policy.126
For at least the following reasons, the trial court's conclusions regarding Mr. Ellison's
damages are erroneous:
First, Mr. Ellison never had a reasonable opportunity to have the Policy converted
prior to his divorce due to the defendants' improper conduct. By making misrepresentations
to Mr. Ellison about what was necessary to maintain the Policy, the defendants thereby
prevented Mr. Ellison from converting the Policy because he had no reason to know or
believe that such was necessary. The defendants' misrepresentations, in effect, stopped Mr.
Ellison from conducting any additional research or seeking further information because he
believed, based upon the defendants' misrepresentations, that he was alright so long as he
continued to pay the premiums.
Second, Mr. Ellison provided the trial court with sworn testimony showing that, after
his wife was diagnosed with cancer, she specifically told Mr. Ellison that she wanted him to
125

R. 648-649.

126

R. 649.
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continue the Policy and use it for the benefit of their children. Simply because the trial court
may not have considered such testimony as being sufficiently credible does not change the
fact that this issue remains disputed. Credibility is a question of fact.127
Third, Sherrie Ellison's desire to have the Policy remain in effect for the benefit of
the Ellisons' children is admissible evidence. Statements by an unavailable declarant, such
as Sherrie Ellison, are not always excluded by the hearsay rule.128 For example, "a statement
made by a declarant while believing that the declarant's death was imminent" may be
admissible.129 Likewise, certain "statements against interest" are also admissible, as
explained earlier.130 The statements at issue by Sherrie Ellison are admissible under both of
these scenarios.
And, fourth, Mr. Ellison suffered damages as a result of the defendants' breach of
contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as discussed in the
following section.
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van der Hevde v. First Colony Life Ins. Co.. 845 P.2d 275, 280 (Utah Ct. App.
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Utah R. Evid. 804(b).
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VI.

GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANTS ON MR. ELLISON'S CLAIMS FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT AND BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.
A.

Breach of Contract.

As reflected in paragraph 13 of the trial court's order, the trial court dismissed Mr.
Ellison's breach of contract claims because, according to the court, "[tjhere's no credible
evidence that the contract provisions were expanded by a, a statement or an action of an
agent of the insurance company."131 As explained earlier, however, questions concerning the
credibility of evidence are issues of fact that should be resolved at trial.132 As also explained
earlier, the evidence Mr. Ellison has submitted is admissible. The trial court, therefore, erred
by dismissing Mr. Ellison's breach of contract claims.
The trial court's dismissal of Mr. Ellison's breach of contract claims was also
erroneous because there are multiple, disputed issues of material fact regarding these claims.
For example:
i.

There is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the defendants are in

breach of contract by failing to provide Mr. Ellison with a copy of the Policy.
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Transcript, at 62:12-14.
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ii.

There is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the County is in breach

of contract by failing to inform Mr. Ellison of his "right to exercise the Conversion
Privilege."133
iii.

There is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the defendants are in

breach of contract by making misrepresentations to Mr. Ellison and providing him with
erroneous instructions regarding the Policy, as explained earlier.
Based upon these disputed issues of material fact, summary judgment should not have
been granted. Instead, the matter should have proceeded to trial so that a jury could have
considered all of the relevant facts and circumstances in order to determine whether there
was a breach of contract and/or of a modified contract between the parties.
B.

Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.

"' A violation of the covenant" of good faith and fair dealing "gives rise to a claim for
breach of contract.'"134 To determine whether there has been a violation of this covenant,
courts consider "the contract language and the course of dealings between and conduct of
the parties."135 In the present case, the course of dealings between and conduct of the parties
suggest that the defendants' actions were neither fair or in good faith.

133

R. 406-407, 542, 595.

134

PDO Lube Or.. Inc. v. Huben 949 P.2d 792, 797-98 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991)).
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"Good faith and fair dealing are fact sensitive concepts, and whether there has been
a breach of good faith and fair dealing is a factual issue, generally inappropriate for decision
as a matter of law."136 Despite this, however, the trial court dismissed Mr. Ellison's claim
against Hartford for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because, according
to the trial court, Mr. Ellison's insurance claim was "fairly debatable."137 But whether Mr.
Ellison's insurance claim was "fairly debatable" ignores the fact that Hartford may have
acted in bad faith and unfairly in ways other than simply denying Mr. Ellison's claim for
benefits.138 Indeed, Hartford's denial of Mr. Ellison's insurance claim is only one of the many
ways that Hartford could have, and did in fact, violate its duty of good faith and fair dealing.
For example, Hartford violated this duty when it made misrepresentations to Mr. Ellison
about the Policy's provisions and procedures. Likewise, Hartford also violated its duty of
good faith and fair dealing by continuing to collect premiums on the Policy from Mr. Ellison
after his divorce. Consequently, the trial court erred by only considering whether Mr.
Ellison's claim for benefits was "fairly debatable." Instead, the trial court should have also
considered whether the facts, together with any reasonable inferences arising therefrom,

136

The Republic Group. Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah Ct. App.

1994).
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R. 652 (citing Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, 56 P.3d 524).
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PDO Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huben 949 P.2d 792, 797-98 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
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when viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Ellison, suggest that Hartford may have
violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing in any other ways.139
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court erred by making improper findings of fact, by not considering
all of the admissible evidence, and by ignoring numerous disputed issues of material fact, the
trial court's order granting summary judgment for the defendants should be reversed, and this
matter should be remanded to the trial court so that the parties may continue preparing for
trial.
t

DATED this-2Xday of August, 2008.

KENNETH PARKINSON, and
ELIJAH L. MILNE, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
Attorneys for Val M. Ellison
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ADDENDUM
Copies of the following materials are attached as appendices to this brief:
A.

Transcript of July 20, 2007 Oral Argument

B.

Signed January 22, 2008 Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of
Defendants

C.

Ellison Phone Call with Hartford Insurance
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PAGE 2

1

P-K-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2

(July 20, 2007)

3
4

THE JUDGE:

All right.

Ellison versus Utah County.

5

MS. VAN ORMAN:

6

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

7

MS. VAN ORMAN:

8

THE JUDGE:

TO

That's okay.
We have two motions that are

We do.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

How do you want to proceed?
Go ahead, Kristin.

I'll be

(short, unable to decipher).

12

MS. VAN ORMAN:

13

THE JUDGE:

14

MS. VAN ORMAN:

15

Your Honor, we h a v e —

pending, both defendants have filed motions so just—

9

11

Let's, let's turn to

Thank you, appreciate it.

All right.
Your Honor, Kristin Van Orman on

behalf of Utah County.

16

MR. PARKINSON:

Your Honor, just so I'm clear are

17

we going to, are we going to let both of them argue or are we

18

going to argue both motions separately—

19

THE JUDGE:

However...

I've read all the

20

briefing.

21

comfortable addressing them one at a time or do you want to

22

a, let them both argue and then you respond?

23

to do it?

24
25

It's kind of similar arguments.

MR. PARKINSON:

Are you more

How do you want

I'm happy to let them both argue

and then a, let me respond.

PAGE 3

1

THE JUDGE:

Let's do it that way.

2

MS. VAN ORMAN:

3

THE JUDGE:

That's fine.

Okay.

ARGUMENT BY MS. VAN ORMAN

4

MS. VAN ORMAN:

5

And, Your Honor, I know you've

6

read extensive briefing so I'm going to be pretty short on

7

this.
This a, matter arises out of a claim for life

8
9

insurance benefits essentially.

Mr. Ellison, the plaintiff

10

is, and was a full-time employee of Utah County and had been

11

for a number of years.

12

Sherry Ellison who has since deceased.

He was married to a woman named

At the time a, before they divorced, they had been

13
14

married for some time, he apparently had a life insurance

15

policy, spousal policy on her.

16

provision, basically it's the kind of policy that you get

17

through your employees (sic?) where you can get extra life

18

insurance for dependents, the key being they have to be a

19

dependent.

20

longer a dependent, they don't qualify for that under the

21

policy.

22

conversion policy.

23

And it's not the employee who has the right to get a

24

conversion policy, it's the, or the spouse, it's their policy

25

to get.

Under that policy there is a

And once a person gets divorced they are no

And what you have to do is you have to get a
It's a completely separate process.

PAGE 4

1
2

THE JUDGE:

From the time that they became

divorced until she became deceased how much time passed?

3

MS. VAN ORMAN:

4

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

5

A month?
It was, it was, the divorce was

finalized in August of 2003 and she passed away on October
19th, 2003 so a little over a month and a half.
THE JUDGE:

Were there premiums collected from

Mr. Ellison during that period of time by Utah County?
9

MS. VAN ORMAN:

I believe that there was a

10

deduction through his a, payroll and the payroll deductions

11

did continue.

12

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

13

MS. VAN ORMAN:

Okay.

Basically what happened

14

is, well, there is a dispute.

15

material fact.

16

the divorce, doesn't know what day, that he goes to Utah

17

County HR Department and says if I'm going to get a divorce

18

can I keep my life insurance on some, on my, on my wife.

19

He doesn't know who he spoke with.

20

recalls speaking with him.

21

the person in charge of the life insurance.

22

never spoke with him.

23

And I don't think this is a

Mr. Ellison contends that one day prior to

THE JUDGE:

Nobody from Utah County

They would have directed him to
She absolutely

He cannot—
Well it's, well it's undisputed that

24

there was a conversation with was it Mrs. Bird or someone

25

from the, I'm trying to remember the n a m e —
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1
2

MS. VAN ORMAN:

That's, that's with the

insurance—

3

THE JUDGE:

4

MS. VAN ORMAN:

—

THE JUDGE:

and had the conversation, which

5

the insurance company.

Correct.

6
7

So she called the insurance company—

—

we've had transcribed.

8

MS. VAN ORMAN:

9

THE JUDGE:

10

continued.

11

Okay.

We also know that the deductions

So from his perspective payment was being made.

MS. VAN ORMAN:

12

Right.

But you have a situation here

13

where number one, Utah County says we were never put on

14

notice of any of this, we don't know anything about this kind

15

of conversation.

16

policy clearly says that you can't continue on a former

17

spouse.

He has a copy of the, the policy.

Under Utah law, as I'm sure the court is aware,

18
19

you have to rely on what is written in the policy.

20

is expected to know what is written in the policy.

21

goes—

22

The

THE JUDGE:

And he
So he

Well, I assume he was worried about it

23

or he wouldn't have made the contacts and the calls.

We know

24

he was talking to somebody, at least one person he talked to

25

and said can I insure her or not.
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MS. VAN ORMAN:

1
2

He talks to somebody at

least at the insurance company—

3
4

Right.

THE JUDGE:

Which makes sense.

He must, surely

must have known she was ill.

5

MS. VAN ORMAN:

He did.

He knew he was, he knew

6

that she was terminally ill and he wanted to get a divorce.

7

I mean, the divorce wasn't even final.

8

situation.

9

So you've got that

There is absolutely no evidence other than his own

10

testimony that he spoke with somebody at Utah County.

11

don't know if he even talked to a county employee.

12

have been somebody in the hallway, it might...

13

know who he spoke with.

14

of that.

15

don't—

It might

He doesn't

Nobody at Utah County recalls any

So to hold the county responsible a, I just

THE JUDGE:

16

We

Well what, what do I make of the

17

county, of, I mean, the inescapable fact the county

18

(inaudible word).

19

county continued the deductions.

20

managing agent for this insurance.

21

works?

The county manages his paycheck, the

22

MS. VAN ORMAN:

23

THE JUDGE:

The county is the, the
Isn't that the way it

I believe so.

The HR Department puts it out.

24

they continue to collect the premiums.

25

that make?

So

What difference does
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MS. VAN ORMAN:
2

They did return the premiums once

they were aware of the situation.
See what happens, here's, here's how it works.

3

You

4

get the automatic deductions, okay.

5

system.

6

their attention that look, there's a divorce and goes what I

7

have a life insurance policy on my former spouse, we need to

8

change this around, don't take a n y —

9

They remember...

THE JUDGE:

It runs through the

It was never even brought to

What's t h e —

10

MS. VAN ORMAN:

11

THE JUDGE:

—

—

deductions out.

what's the policy about that kind

12

of notification?

13

there a policy that specifies how and when the county should

14

be notified to modify the deductions?

15

MS. VAN ORMAN:

16

set policy.

17

county was not...

18

If an employee becomes divorced a, is

I don't believe that there is a

The county was aware of a divorce but the

Basically what happened is the HR Department became

19

aware that there was a divorce that was pending, but they

20

weren't a w a r e —

21

THE JUDGE:

Well, a divorce pending is a lot

22

different than a divorce granted.

23

MS. VAN ORMAN:

Correct.

And then you also have

24

to go with the divorce and say all right now, let's pull all

25

of his policies and let's see if it qualifies and if it
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fits.
2

And if he happened to have this other policy on this

spouse.

3

THE JUDGE:

Well—

4

MS. VAN ORMAN:

I mean, this is something that he

5

would need to come to the county with and say look, I have

6

this problem, I have this issue how do we resolved it.

7

There's—
THE JUDGE:

8
9

You're, you're saying because he would

have knowledge the burden logically should be on him.
MS. VAN ORMAN:

10

Correct.

And further than that,

11

Your Honor, it would be Sherry, it would be the spouse

12

because that is her policy.

13

that's probably our greatest argument is I don't believe he

14

has standing in this case.

15

dispute.

16

after the divorce would have to come to Utah County and say

17

I have this policy, it's for me to convert, it's for me to

18

make the premium payments, it's for me to apply for it in

19

the first place, then to make the premiums, and then to

20

name a beneficiary.

21

do.

22

right to do it, it wasn't his policy to do it.

23

hers.

24
25

This is not...

He did not even...

And, and

This is not his policy to
This is something that Sherry

Those are all things that Sherry had to

It could not be done by Mr. Ellison, he didn't have the
It was

And she didn't do that.
And the problem we have here is there is no

evidence and especially my a, co-defense counsel here has
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1

pointed out I thought very clearly in his brief that there's

2

no admissible evidence, it's all hearsay that she would have

3

done any of this.

4

knew she would have done that.

5

you look at the evidence that's available, in other words,

6

the divorce decree that is a very very specific lengthy

7

divorce decree, that decree specifies that Ms. Ellison has to

8

maintain health insurance, he has to maintain his life

9

insurance policies for his children.

10
11

Mr. Ellison says well, I knew her and I
But the problem is is when

It says nothing about

the policy on his wife.
THE JUDGE:

Your position is that even, even if

12

she had not passed away if a couple, one of whom is an

13

employee of the county has life insurance, they get divorced,

14

they say nothing, they continue to pay the premiums for a

15

month, a week, a day, a year or 10 years.

16

spouse who was not an employee passes away, at that point

17

you're saying that under the contract life insurance doesn't

18

continue, what you would do, what you would have to do is

19

refund the premiums but not, not recognize life insurance

20

because the divorce had happened?

21

MS. VAN ORMAN:

No.

At some point the

What I'm saying, Your Honor,

22

is that you're getting a divorce from somebody and you say

23

wait a minute, I, I know what kind of life insurance policies

24

I have and I know what policies my spouse—

25

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

But let's, l e t ' s —
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1

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

2

THE JUDGE:

3

What's the consequence of that?

5

my spouse has.

But let's assume they don't do that.

MS. VAN ORMAN:

4

—

Well, what they need to do is they

need to be aware of that.

6

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

7

MS. VAN ORMAN:

Because under the policy that,

8

that they know that they have they have to look at the policy

9

and say okay, she's not going to be a dependent anymore, I

10

need to find out what we need to do.
THE JUDGE:

11

Understood.

But let's assume, let's

12

assume for my hypothetical that they don't, they just let it

13

ride, they let the deductions continue.

14

continues to work for the county, continues to pay every

15

month for a policy of life insurance.

16

dies.

The employee

Then the insured

And your position is that because the insured is no

17
18

longer a spouse and, and hasn't been a spouse for some time

19

you can't honor that life insurance policy, you would at that

20

point refund the premiums because that's when you would find

21

out—

22

MS. VAN ORMAN:

23

THE JUDGE:

24

MS. VAN ORMAN:

25

Absolutely.

That's w h e n —
—

(short inaudible).
—

there's notification.

And the burden is on the individual or
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1

individuals who have the policy to provide that kind of

2

notification.

3

they are bound by.

4

can they change anything.

5

look, there's a divorce and guess what I've got this life

6

insurance, I don't want to continue it anymore, or I do want

7

to continue it what do we need to do here, then that can set

8

things in motion.

That's what the policy requires, that's what
And if nobody knows what's going on how
I mean, if the county is notified

But there's no evidence that that happened.

9

And

10

that's the problem.

11

life insurance company, that there was no notification

12

given.

They have to do something, they have to notify.
And this is Sherry's burden to do that a, because

13
14

We're stuck in a position, as is the-

it's her policy.

She's the o n e —

15

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative)—

16

MS. VAN ORMAN:

—

who would have to apply for the

17

conversion policy.

I don't think it's even an automatic

18

conversion, I think you have to apply for it.

19

got to affirmatively make the payments, then she's got to

20

name the beneficiary.

Then she's

And here's, here's the rub on this is you look at a

21
22

divorce decree, and I believe there was a restraining order

23

put in place between these folks.

24

divorce.

25

we're going to now assume that this woman who had a

This was not an amicable

We're jumping to a whole other leap here where
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resti a: ning crier aja-.'.s: the plaintiff is going to continue
2

on with this insurance policy and name him as a

3

beneficiary?

4

evidence as to that except from Mr. Ellison's own testimony

5

that well, I knew her and I think that's what she would do.

6

Maybe she would name the children directly.

7

name her parents or a brother or a sister.

8

But certainly to give him the power to bring this kind of an

9

action there's just no evidence to support that.

10

That is just such speculation.

There's no

Maybe she would
We don't know.

And so, Your Honor, I think that's the county's

11

position.

12

even spoke to anybody at Utah County with authority to alert

13

them of this type of position.

14

there would be some kind of a change in deducting the

15

payroll.

16

problem and at least gave them the, the money back.

17

I think that there's no evidence as to that he

If they were alerted then

Once they were alerted then they rectified the

But this isn't his case to bring, this would have

18

been Sherry's, these was her decisions.

19

position where he can't bring any evidence and so that's why

20

we believe we're entitled to summary judgment.

21
22
23
24
25

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

And now he's in a

Thank you.

ARGUMENT BY MR. CHRISTIANSEN
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Good morning, Your Honor.

It's

nice to see you again.
My name is Erik Christiansen and I represent
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1

Hartford Life.
I'm going to do this a little bit differently.

2
3

I'm going to kind of run through each of the specific claims

4

that have been made against Hartford and talk about why we

5

believe Hartford is entitled to summary judgment on each

6

claim.
And as a remainder there are four claims pled

7
8

against Hartford here.

There's a claim for breach of

9

contract being the insurance contract, there's a claim for

10

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

11

dealing, there's a claim for fraud and a claim for

12

estoppel.

13

against Hartford by the plaintiff.

So those are the four claims that have been made

The...

14

Let me talk a little bit about what the

15

policy terms are.

16

What Hartford does is issues a policy to Utah County, and

17

Utah County then allows people to pay into that and become a

18

part of that policy or not.

19

Utah County sends a bulk check to us and they administer the

20

policy.

21

This is a group life insurance policy.

And each month what happens is

We handle the claims handling.
The policy term says that it covers dependents, and

22

a dependent is defined in the policy as a spouse or an

23

unmarried child.

24

the policy you have to be a spouse or an unmarried child.

25

So in order to be a dependent covered by

It's undisputed that under the terms of the policy
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1

once Sherry Ellison was no longer a spouse she was no longer

2

a dependent and, therefore, not covered under the terms of

3

the policy.

4

There is a provision in the policy that allows

5

conversion.

6

policy.

7

become a non-dependent, if you're a spouse that becomes an

8

ex-spouse, you can convert and have your own policy in your

9

own name provided you do a couple of things.

And that's that magic word here in the, in the

And what that says is that if you're going to

First is the

10

policy provides you have to provide written application to

11

Hartford, second you have to provide that written

12

application within 31 days of the date that you become an

13

ex-spouse.

14

policy if Sherry Ellison wanted to have a life insurance

15

policy with Hartford she would have to fill out an

16

application, submit it to Hartford, and do that within 31

17

days of the day of her divorce.

18

record that that wasn't done.

19

standpoint there's no dispute that those terms of the

20

contract were not complied with.

21

contractual obligation to honor a claim that there was life

22

insurance on Sherry Ellison.

So under the unambiguous terms of the insurance

There's no dispute in the
So just from a contractual

So Hartford had no

23

The theory that plaintiffs have come up with to try

24

to get around that is really the heart of where we are in the

25

case.

They're, they've come up with a couple different
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1

theories.

The first theory is that there was some kind of a

2

modification of this contract, that somehow the conversation

3

that took place between Mr. Ellison and Ms. Daly, the

4

Hartford customer representative person—
THE JUDGE:

I said Bird.

But that's what it is,

it's Ms. Daly.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

7

Ms. Daly.

That somehow that

8

modified the written contract.

9

brief a number of reasons why that modification theory

10

And we've set forth in our

fails.
First of all, there's no evidence in the record

11
12

anywhere that Hartford knowingly was modifying the terms of

13

that contract.

14

think you'll conclude that's not a knowing modification of a

15

written policy term life insurance contract with Utah

16

County.

17

Look very carefully at that transcript, I

And the second point on that is really important.

18

That contract exists between Hartford and Utah County.

19

only people who can bargain to modify that contract would be

20

Hartford and Utah County.

21

in the record that Utah County bargained with Hartford to

22

modify the terms of that contract.

23

The

And there's no evidence anywhere

Mr. Ellison is not a party to that contract.

He's

24

a participant in a plan but he's not a contracting party.

25

Thus there is no evidence of any meeting of the
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1

minds of the contracting parties to modify that written

2

contract.

3

matter of law given the position of the parties with respect

So we think the modification theory fails as a

to that insurance contract.
The, a couple other little arguments we make in our
brief on the modification theory are that any modification of
a written agreement must be spelled out with sufficient
definiteness to be enforceable.
9
10

I submit there's not

evidence here that that standard which is found in the Pack
versus Case case has been satisfied.
Moreover, there was no consideration for the

11
12

modification a, Hartford wasn't paid anything in addition

13

to—
THE JUDGE:

14

I recognize Hartford says that.

But

15

the one thing we do know, or one of the few things we do know

16

is that money was taken out of his check for the premiums.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

17

By Utah County.

And we don't,

18

we don't have visibility to that.

19

administrator of the policy and we just get one bulk check,

20

we don't know who is not covered—

21

THE JUDGE:

22

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

23
24
25

Because they are the

Well—
It's their obligation to do

that.
THE JUDGE:

Well, not knowing you got

consideration is different than not getting any
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1

ability to go get the policy and through reasonable

2

diligence can read the policy and see what it says.

3

important here.

4

a copy of the policy, the plaintiff did not ask Utah County

5

for a copy of the policy.

6

and it was Utah County, for a copy of the policy was after

7

his ex-wife had already passed away.

8

order to learn what the terms of the policy were was to call

9

up Utah County or walk in their, their office and say I'd

Because plaintiff never asked Hartford for

The only time he did ask anybody,

All he had to do in

10

like to look at the policy to see what I do in this

11

situation.

12

Very

The Utah Supreme Court in Perkins versus Great

13

West Life has held in that circumstance he cannot claim

14

fraud.

15

Now, there's another case that the court, the Utah

16

Supreme Court issued which makes that clear again.

17

called the Youngblood versus Auto Owners case.

18

a distinction.

19

the policy is obtained those can give rise to fraud claims,

20

if it's a fraud in the inducement about what's going to be

21

covered by the policy and it turns out the policy is

22

different than how it was represented when it was sold that

23

can give rise to a fraud and inducement claim.

24

representations made after the issuance of the policy are not

25

actionable as fraud.

It's

And it draws

It says if representations are made before

The

And those two cases together make that
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very clear that that's the law in Utah.
The next point on fraud is there's no
representation made by Hartford of a presently existing fact
which is a requirement for a fraud claim.

At best giving

the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt of Ms.. Daly's
representations, all she's saying is she thinks in the
future that insurance can be obtained if premiums are paid on
it.

That's giving them every benefit of the doubt of that

transcript, which I don't think that's what that transcript
says.

But that's a representation about the future, it's -

not about today and what's happening today.
And the Republic Group versus (inaudible) case
and a lot of other cases say that you have to have
representation of a presently existing fact to give rise to a
fraud claim.
THE JUDGE:

Yes.

And I guess the, the point in

fact that I'm struggling with the most and, and was reflected
I think in my area of questions as that you read the Daly
conversation and a, and if I construe inferences against the
moving parties here, then I say what was Mr. Ellison
thinking, what was going on this his head, what, what
conclusions would a layperson engaging in that conversation
come away with.

Here's a guy who has insurance on an

existing spouse, it's been going along, the money is being
taken out.

He calls and says can the insurance continue,
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1

sure if you pay the premiums, and you've got to fill out a

2

paper, better call somebody.

3

well I need something in writing for the court.

4

you've got to call somebody.

5

paycheck, it's coming out.

6

if I keep paying the payments, must be still going.

Well that's in response just to

Okay.

Well,

Continues to get his

Well, they said we could continue

I mean, isn't that an existing fact that the, the,

7

the fact being the existence of a contractual relationship,
the existence of an ongoing policy doesn't, couldn't we infer
10

that he drew from that conversation that there was in fact an

11

ongoing policy of insurance to cover his now divorced

12

ex-wife?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

13

I think you could make that

14

argument.

But I think it was really the statements were

15

about in the future, can I continue ib, can I continue it

16

when we get divorced.

17

I don't think that's disputed that there wasn't a divorce

18

yet.

The divorce hadn't happened yet.

19

THE JUDGE:

20

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

21

And

At the time of that call.
At the time of that call.

So

I think that's, that's the distinction there.

22

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

23

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

The other really important

24

part of the fraud argument is there's no scienter here.

25

There's no evidence anywhere in this case of fraudulent
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1

intent.

They don't even make an effort to marshal any

2

evidence of fraudulent intent.
All they say really is that well, premiums were

3

paid so they must have been motivated to collect the premiums
by saying, you know, the statements about what could happen
when they get divorced.
7

high hurdle of scienter.
And I think it's really important to go back and

8
9

That's not enough to satisfy the

look at two very important pieces of evidence that are before

10

the court on how this issue is administered.

The

11

administration policy of Utah County, their own policy which

12

is before the court says in it, and I quote:

13

That your responsibilities...

14

You being Utah County,

15

... include notifying employees of

16

their right to exercise the conversion

17

privilege.

18

It's Utah County's obligation to do that.

It's not

19

Hartford's.

20

policy.

21

with the plaintiff about this.

22

obligation, duty according to the administration policy.

23

We don't administer it, they administer the

So it's not our burden to have any conversations
It's Utah County's

Secondly, Peggy Poulsen's (phonetic) own testimony,

24

and she's a Utah County person in charge of this, she

25

admitted that it was Utah County's duty to discusses
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1

conversion with employees.

2

policy is Utah County's obligation, it's not Hartford.
THE JUDGE:

3

Again, the administration of the

Well, what's the consequence if Utah

4

County failed m

5

does the, does the consequence of that failure fall upon the

6

employee or does it fall upon the county?

7

wouldn't there, shouldn't the court in that circumstance find

8

coverage but then allow you a cause of action against the

9

county saying you didn't do your job and this is what it cost

10

us?

11

the county?

either or both of those duties?

Wouldn't then,

I mean, isn't that a contract dispute between you and
Why does the employee enter in there?

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

12

Does that,

No.

I don't think there's, I

13

don't think that's how it works.

14

that how it works is that the relationship for administration

15

of the plan is between the county and that person, and so

16

there's no duty on our part, there's no relationship on our

17

part.

18

I think that a, I think

And I'll let Ms. Van Orman discuss her arguments of

19

why that doesn't cause a cause of action between the county

20

and the plaintiff.

21
22

THE JUDGE:

I, what I'm, what I'm struggling with

is that you're saying you escape a d u t y —

23

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

24

THE JUDGE:

25

—

By contract.
because the county failed in the

duty you, you escape an obligation to Ellison if there is
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1

o.ie, you, }G~ escape your obligation to Ellison because the

2

county failed in their obligation to Ellison.

3

follow the logic of that.

4
5

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

THE JUDGE:

7

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Well, I —

THE JUDGE:

10

I appreciate that.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

THE JUDGE:
their duty to tell him.

14

didn't.

And they, and apparently they

15

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

16

THE JUDGE:

17

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

20

the opportunity to discuss

But you're, you're saying gee it's

13

19

—

conversion.

12

18

I think she would say they

didn't have notice of, that they didn't h a v e —

9

11

Well, I'm not sure that

Ms. Van Orman would say they failed.

6

8

I'm not sure I

Well if they, t h e y —

Why does it matter?
—

had the opportunity to do

so it was their duty a n d —
THE JUDGE:

And the only reason it could be

relevant in your argument is if it didn't happen.

21

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

22

THE JUDGE:

23

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Right.

Right.

Okay.

Finally on the fraud

Okay.

24

argument, and I'm going to try and move this along, is that

25

there are no damages here for Mr. Ellison.

And that's what

PAGE 25

1
2

THE JUDGE:

3

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Yes.
And that's because a converted

4

policy belongs to Sherry Ellison.

5

unambiguous terms of the group policy here, the only person

6

who contractually can get that policy would be Sherry.

7

it's undisputed that she didn't convert the policy.

8

undisputed that there's no admissible evidence that even if

9

she had converted the policy that she would have named

Under the clear

10

Mr. Ellison as the beneficiary of that.

11

whatsoever.

12

evidentiary objections we made to the self-serving

13

statements made by Mr. Ellison on that.

And
It's

No evidence

No response even in our brief to the

14

And so I agree if, if there would be any potential

15

claim here, and I don't think there is, it potentially might

16

belong to the estate of Sherry Ellison.

17

belong to her husband.

He doesn't have standing, he hasn't

18

suffered the damages.

Okay?

19

But it wouldn't

Finally, just keep in mind that the burden here for

20

plaintiffs on fraud is clear and convincing evidence.

21

don't think they've come anywhere close to satisfying that

22

high burden that existed for (short inaudible).

23

I

The real heart of this case really comes down to

24

the estoppel claim.

25

spends the most of their time in their opposition briefs, and

I think that's where the plaintiff
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1

I think that's really where the court has to dig into both

2

the Perkins case and the Youngblood case to decide that

3

claim.

4

And the Perkins case makes it very clear that m

5

estoppel, that doctrine, cannot be used to expand coverage

6

beyond the policy terms.

7

the terms of a policy under Utah law using the doctrine of

8

estoppel.

9

context quote:

I think that's the claim where the real fight is.
Utah

In other words, you can't rewrite

And the Perkins court says in the insurance

10

The doctrine of estoppel cannot be used

11

to bring risks which were not covered by

12

the terms of the policy within coverage

13

of the policy.

14

And again, the Youngblood and Perkins cases make

Close quote.

15

the same distinction I talked about before and that is that

16

estoppel can be used for representations that are preissuance

17

of the policy but not representations made after the policy

18

is in place.

19

clearly made after the Hartford Utah County policy is in

20

place.

21

And again, the representations here are

There's also case law we've given again which says

22

that to give rise to estoppel the alleged representations

23

must be very definite and very specific.

24

Rodawes (phonetic) case out of Massachusetts.

25

That comes from a

And finally we make an argument a, I just wanted
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1

to bring it to the court's attention, that Ms. Daly's

2

(phonetic) statements cannot be reasonably held to have bound

3

Hartford because she made it very clear in her statement that

4

this wasn't her area, it wasn't her department and she

5

referred him elsewhere.
THE JUDGE:

6

What's the difference between that

7

argument about Ms. Daly's (phonetic) conversation in the

8

context of estoppel and that argument in the context of

9

fraud?

Burden of proof?

10

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Yes, I agree.

11

Finally, the last claim that's pled against

12

Hartford is a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair

13

dealing.

Again—

14

THE JUDGE:

15

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

16

THE JUDGE:

17

the estoppel claim?

Well, before you move to that.

What's the relationship of damages to
It seems to me that a , —

18

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

19

THE JUDGE:

20

recover on estoppel?

21
22

—

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:
Your Honor.

They want t h e —
necessary proof for, for, to

It is, it is.

It is as well,

Thank you for reminding me of that.

23

THE JUDGE:

24

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

25

Yes.

All right.
Yes.

And so I meant that

damages argument to apply to all of the claims.
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1

THE JUDGE:

All right.

2

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

The last claim that's pled is

3

the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

4

dealing.

5

that as not a tort claim but a contract claim that follows

6

from the insurance contract.

7

insurance companies invoke which applies here, and that is

8

where the claim is fairly debatable, in other words, where

9

like mind could say well, I could see where Hartford has an

And as Your Honor knows Utah law on that interprets

Utah has a defense that

10

argument and I can say where the plaintiff has an argument

11

there's no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and

12

fair dealing.

13

fairly debatable but it's barred by the unambiguous terms of

14

the policy, so it's not even fairly debatable, it's crystal

15

clear that there's no contract claim.

16

We submit not only is there, is the claim

So with those arguments in mind we really believe

17

that under the facts and circumstances here Hartford is

18

entitled to a summary judgment and we would request that be

19

entered.

20
21

ARGUMENT BY MR. PARKINSON
MR. PARKINSON:

Your Honor, if I might I think I'm

22

a, of course, by accepting this I get hit by all sides and

23

have a lot of things, a lot of issues to cover.

24

if I, if I, if I can I'd like to maybe start with a, the

25

Perkins Youngblood analysis.

But I think
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1

And the court should be awaie that the Youngblood

2

case and the Perkins case were both Court of Appeals cases.

3

Since the initial briefing of this case the Supreme Court has

4

weighed in in the Youngblood case and I think it

5

substantially turns the analysis on the Perkins Youngblood

6

cases.

I have a copy of that case here.

7

THE JUDGE:

When was it decided?

8

MR. PARKINSON:

9

The Youngblood case, by the way, was a case where

It was decided on March 23rd.

10

a fellow went to go apply for automobile insurance, he was

11

doing it under the name of his company, he had a

12

conversations with a, a person who was selling him the

13

policy, they had discussions about the policy.

14

he was a, told that he should get this underinsured motorist

15

coverage because that would protect him if he were crossing

16

the street and he got ran over by someone.

17

And in that

By a reading of the policy a, if you read the

18

policy, and I think both sides eventually conceded this, if

19

you read the policy they a, he wouldn't be covered because

20

he was buying it as a, as a company and it would only apply

21

to him if he purchased it as an individual if he was crossing

22

the street and got ran over by someone.

23

course, is going to happen that brings us to the court is he

24

was in a parking lot and got run over by someone and then

25

we're here before the court.

Well what, of
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And I think it was agreed, like I say, that the

1
2

plan language of the insurance policy didn't extend

3

protection to him under these circumstances.

4

And then there was raised the issue of equitable

5

estoppel and. and the estoppel line of cases, Perkins was

6

discussed, the Youngblood a, case was discussed.

7

court makes a distinction between equitable estoppel and

8

promissory estoppel and there's a lot of discussion about

9

that, about how equitable estoppel tends to be more of a

And the

10

shield.

11

cases had been, had been muddled about their decisions on

12

this, or the appellate cases had been muddled on their

13

decisions about this, and promissory estoppel was more of a

14

sword.

15

differences in a promissory estoppel about whether it's a

16

presently existing fact or a promise on a, on a future

17

existing fact.

18

And the court acknowledged that the Supreme Court

And there was a lot of discussion about the

THE JUDGE:

Well it's clear isn't it that the

19

Youngblood case in, in either court was essentially an

20

allegation that a misrepresentation was made to the client so

21

that they would purchase the insurance, and that was the

22

circumstance.

23

MR. PARKINSON:

24

THE JUDGE:

25

Yes.

And, and the summary judgment for the

a, was affirmed because?
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MR. PARKINSON:

1

Summary judgment was, summary-

2

judgment by the appellate court in Youngblood was

3

overturned.

4
5

They sent, they sent it back and then it w a s —

THE JUDGE:

This was, this was summary judgment in

favor of?
MR. PARKINSON:

The a, the company brought, the

insurance company brought a, a motion for summary judgment—
THE JUDGE:

The trial court s a y s —

MR. PARKINSON:

9
10

THE JUDGE:

11

MR. PARKINSON:

12

THE JUDGE:

13

MR. PARKINSON:

14

THE JUDGE:

15

insurance company wins.
It goes to the Court of Appeals.

Court of Appealssays overturned.
Overturned.

Supreme Court says no, the insurance

company wins.
MR. PARKINSON:

16
17

—

The trial court grants that.

No. The Supreme Court says it's

still overturned—

18

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

19

MR. PARKINSON:

—

but they use a different

20

analysis.

21

But just what they've done is they've eliminated the

22

difference between promissory estoppel and equitable

23

estoppel.

And maybe I've taken too long to get to that.

24

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

25

MR. PARKINSON:

And the elements of estoppel, now
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particularly now this might not apply m
2

context, that's a little fuzzy m

3

THE JUDGE:

4

MR. PARKINSON:

5

a non-insurance

here.

All right.
But m

paragraph 25 page five a,

it describes what the elements are that courts should
consider after, after the second Youngblood case.

It says,

When an agent makes a material
representation to the prospective insured
9

as to the scope of coverage or other

10

important policy benefits—

11

THE JUDGE:

Stop right there.

Do we have a

12

prospective insured here?

13

who, who is the agent and who is the prospective insured?

14

I mean the representation that's here is as to whether

15

there's ongoing insurance so how does this, how does this

16

case apply?

17

MR. PARKINSON:

Do we have an agent?

I mean

Well this, first this is the line

18

of cases that they are relying on to get, to a say that it

19

overcomes our, our decision here.

20

and I think when you read the whole case I think it's clear

21

that they are saying that it doesn't matter where in this

22

process that these statements are made, that if there are

23

material representations made by someone with authority to do

24

so a, and you reasonably rely on those representations, then

25

you can enforce that contract.

But I think he, it is a,
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1

THE JUDGE:

2

MR. PARKINSON:

3

THE JUDGE:

4

Okay.

Well, well l e t ' s —

You can enforce that claim.

Who was the person in a position to

make the representations and what was the reliance here?
MR. PARKINSON:

5

Okay.

There are, and if I can I

6

want to go over this factual aspect and include the county in

7

it as well.

8

here.
THE JUDGE:

9

Okay.

MR. PARKINSON:

10
11

There are three separate representations made

And I think it's easy to get lost

and forget that.
First, in both of the a, there's one that's

12
13

confirmed in writing that we have the transcript of, and the

14

other two representations a, are supported by the

15

transcript.
The first statement was from the county.

16
17

Mr. Ellison testified that he went to the county and talked

18

with someone in personnel and asked what he needed to do.

19

They said all you need to do is keep paying a, keep paying on

20

your policy and you'll continue to have coverage.
THE JUDGE:

21

And, and the only evidence we have

22

of that is Ellison's as statement that somebody told him

23

that.
MR. PARKINSON:

24
25

That's, that's not correct

actually.
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1

THE JUDGE:

What else do we have?

2

MR. PARKINSON:

Because we have this transcript of

3

the insurance telephone call that he made afterwards.

4

has a the first conversation with the person from Utah

5

County.

6

THE JUDGE:

7

MR. PARKINSON:

Okay.
And this is all long before, this

8

is a, long before Ms. Ellison dies, had the first

9

conversation—

10

THE JUDGE:

11

MR. PARKINSON:

12

THE JUDGE:

13

Before—
—

and what does he s a y —

And indeed it's before they are

divorced.

14
15

So he

MR. PARKINSON:

Indeed it's before they are

divorced.

16

THE JUDGE:

17

MR. PARKINSON:

All right.
And what does he say?

Okay.

18

guess I work for Utah County government and so you guys

19

apparently have taken over our life insurance here.

20

wife and I are getting a divorce.

21

that you can continue the insurance on your spouse even if

22

you get divorced.
THE JUDGE:

24

MR. PARKINSON:

25

And my

But the personnel told me

Is this accurate?

23

I

So—

How does that corroborate?
And he tells them when he has no

reason to do so that he got this information from Utah County
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1

and that he's spoken with the personnel people and that he

2

was given this number and told to call them and talk with

3

them about his insurance policy issue.
THE JUDGE:

4

Did, maybe that he had the phone, I

5

mean, it's the same source so same source can't corroborate

6

itself.

7

the Daly (phonetic) call corroborates Ellison's claim that he

8

talked to someone at the county?

So I'm, I'm reaching for what in that, what part of

MR. PARKINSON:

9
10

Well he said, he said that

personnel told me that you can continue insurance—

11

THE JUDGE:

Well, he said it twice.

12

MR. PARKINSON:

13

THE JUDGE:

—

insurance on your spouse.

He said it twice.

But what I'm

14

looking for is what is there that, that independently

15

corroborates that statement that he's making?
MR. PARKINSON:

16

Well I, I think it independently

17

corroborates it by virtue of the time in which he makes the

18

statement, which he would have no incentive to make something

19

up or to, he's just trying to find out what to do on

20

insurance.

21

and—

22

He tells them I talked with the county and a,

THE JUDGE:

So hearsay becomes reliable because

23

the hearsay declarant a, is a reliable person?

Aren't we

24

looking for something outside the bearer of the hearsay that

25

would corroborate?

Isn't that the nature of
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1

corroboration?

2

MR. PARKINSON:

v'oli, in my mind this is helpful

3

in a, in understanding that he did talk to the personnel,

4

I'm—

5

THE JUDGE:

6

MR. PARKINSON:

7

THE JUDGE:

8

MR. PARKINSON:

9

process.

Okay.

All right.

I'm not sure if I'm, if I'm—

So you've got, you've g o t —
—

missing your thinking

He, he talks with them, he's testified that he's

10

talked with them.

11

about how he's talked with them, admittedly that is his, that

12

is himself but it's before he has any incentive t o —

And then there's another source that talks

13

THE JUDGE:

14

MR. PARKINSON:

15

THE JUDGE:

16

representations.

17

You said, you s a i d —
—

to make anything up.

You said there were three

The third is?

MR. PARKINSON:

The third, the third is that as a,

18

was discussed a, in the end she gives him another number,

19

another person to talk to and transfers him over to that

20

person.

21

and received a, a third corroboration that that is the

22

policy. So h e —

And he testifies that he talked to this other person

23

THE JUDGE:

24

to identify or find?

25

Is this a person that we've been able

MR. PARKINSON:

We don't, we don't know who that
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1

person is.

2

conversation here and Mr. Ellison's testimony that he talked

3

with a third person and those, and that other person at

4

Hartford also stated that all he needed to do was to continue

5

paying on the policy.

6

We don't have any evidence other than the

THE JUDGE:

If it occurred, all three of these

7

representations were at a time when a, his wife was alive and

8

still his wife.

9

MR. PARKINSON:

10

THE JUDGE:

11

MR. PARKINSON:

12

THE JUDGE:

13

Correct.

Okay.
Correct.

And, and these representations induced

him to do what?

14

MR. PARKINSON:

Those representations, by virtue

15

of those representations he was induced to continue to pay

16

premiums because that was all that was necessary for him to

17

recover under the insurance policy.

18

did.

19

And that's what he

Now, the Youngblood court kind of goes through the

20

analysis said, the analysis of this, and it says on the one

21

hand a, determined in paragraph 3 4 —

22

THE JUDGE:

23

MR. PARKINSON:

24

reasonableness is not based on the

25

subjective state of mind of the person

Uh-huh (affirmative).
... a determination of
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1

claiming he was misled, but rather it is

2

based on an objective test what would a

3

reasonable person conclude under these

4

circumstances.

5

THE JUDGE:

6

MR. PARKINSON:

Okay.
It's our contention that with that

7

type of standard it definitely becomes a question of fact for

8

a jury to decide what would a reasonable person do.

9

paragraph 35 it says reliant u p o n —
THE JUDGE:

10
11

In

So, so you can never have summary

judgment on a reasonable person issue?
MR. PARKINSON:

12

Well, no.

I, I think you probably

13

could.

14

this case that would be inappropriate.

15

agent's material misrepresentations regarding coverage may or

16

may not be reasonable depending upon the facts of the

17

individual case.

18

In paragraph 35 I think it makes it clear that in

THE JUDGE:

Reliance upon an

Well, and what they've told me is that

19

in, in a situation where it isn't the victim of the

20

misrepresentation being, entering into insurance contract

21

(inaudible word, away from mic) the inducement, it's where

22

the person has or has clear and ready access to the, to the

23

terms of the policy and the representation is as to what

24

that policy says when it's, it's as a matter of law under

25

Utah precedent, Perkins specifically, it's not reasonable for
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zhaz
2

person to have relied or. what the agent said instead of

reading the contract that's available to them.

3

MR. PARKINSON:

4

THE JUDGE:

5
6
7

That w a s —

That's what Perkins says.

Does

Youngblood overturn Perkins?
MR. PARKINSON:

That's what, that's what happened

in Youngblood.

8

THE JUDGE:

9

MR. PARKINSON:

But—
In Youngblood he had the policy

10

available to him.

11

case a, Mr. Ellison did not have a copy of the policy

12

contrary to prior representations, he didn't have a copy of

13

the policy.

14

reading of the policy acknowledged by both sides provided

15

that he had no coverage under the circumstances.

16
17
18

He had a copy of the policy.

Youngblood had a copy of the policy.

THE JUDGE:

difference that in Youngblood they specifically say,
... the party who reasonably relied on
the misrepresentations in buying the

20

coverage.

21

I'm looking at paragraph 39.

23

A clear

You don't think that makes a

19

22

In this

Isn't, isn't that

quite different than this circumstance?
MR. PARKINSON:

I don't think so.

First, he's

24

buying the coverage every time he continues to pay that

25

policy, every time he continues to pay on that policy he's
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1

buying that coverage.

He's getting that coverage.

He a,

2

he knows about it.

3

person had that policy and looked at it and, and/or I

4

shouldn't say he looked at it, he didn't, he acknowledged

5

that he didn't look at it.

And this is a case where a. a, the

6

THE JUDGE:

7

MR. PARKINSON:

Well, what do you claim for damages?
With respect to damages a,

8

Mr. Ellison paid for a particular coverage, he worked for

9

that coverage, a, he a, he relied on statements that were

10

made to him, and he should be entitled to receive that

11

coverage.

12
13
14
15

THE JUDGE:

Well it's not cover...

after the divorce the policy is hers, it's not his, is it?
MR. PARKINSON:

We go to the, we go to the

statements that they are talking about.

16

THE JUDGE:

17

MR. PARKINSON:

18

The policy,

Uh-huh (affirmative).
They're saying all those should

not be a, that those statement should not be admitted—

19

THE JUDGE:

20

MR. PARKINSON:

21

THE JUDGE:

Even, e v e n —
—

they say there's n o —

Even if we say that there was a policy

22

that continued and he paid the premiums, what could he

23

recover in this lawsuit?

24

proceeds from the insurance.

25

decedent, he's not, she's not his dependent, he's not a

He wouldn't be entitled to the
He's, he's not related to the
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1
2

beneficiary to the policy.
MR. PARKINSON:

What does he gee?
Well, and I think that's where the

3

estoppel argument is particularly a, important here because

4

they should be estopped from denying him the benefits of the

5

coverage because they made representations that he reasonably

6

relied on or that there is at least a factual issue about

7

whether he reasonably relied on those, on those

8

representations.

9

THE JUDGE:

Well, so the representations is not

10

only that, that the coverage could continue but that the

11

beneficiary relationship would continue as if there had been

12

no divorce?

13
14
15
16

MR. PARKINSON:
was calling about.
THE JUDGE:
conversation.

Gosh, I didn't see that in the

Can you, can you direct me to that?

MR. PARKINSON:

18

THE JUDGE:

19

MR. PARKINSON:

20

THE JUDGE:

22
23

He wanted, that's what he

He wanted to k n o w —

17

21

Yes.

I—

All right.

It's exhibit, which o n e —
I don't know the exhibit number.

We'll find it.

They are all nicely

tabbed, nicely tabbed exhibits.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

I think it's Tab 8,

Your Honor.

24

THE JUDGE:

25

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Eight?
Yes.
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1

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

2

MR. PARKINSON:

3

THE JUDGE:

Very well.

All right.

Okay.

A—

I am (short inaudible) calling from

4

Utah.

5

that the insurance policy continued, can continue but that in

6

spite of the divorce Mr. Ellison would continue to be a

7

beneficiary, which is contrary to the clear terms of the

8

policy.

9

there's got to be representation that that's going to

10
11

happen.

Now what I'm looking for is a representation not only

So if he's going to be estopped it seems to me that

And I did not see it.
MR. PARKINSON:

But if you c a n —

Well I think it's, at first near

12

the top half the paragraph that starts with okay seems to be

13

a, kind of the important paragraph here.

14

THE JUDGE:

15

MR. PARKINSON:

16
17
18

I'm sorry.

Where are we?

The paragraph that starts with

okay under the paragraph that starts, that is the word ya.
THE JUDGE:

(Inaudible word), let me find it.

About the middle of the first page?

19

MR. PARKINSON:

20

THE JUDGE:

21

taken over our life insurance.

22

and I are getting a divorce.

23

told me t h a t —

24

MR. PARKINSON:

25

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

You guys apparently have

—

My wife
Personnel

Yes, this is the paragraph.
you can continue insurance
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on your spouse even if you get divorced.
MR. PARKINSON:
THE JUDGE:

Yes.

I believe so, yes.

I

haven't heard anything as to why.

I

think that's your option if you want to,
if you want to, they're going to do
payroll deducting for her so if you want
to keep her on there that's fine.
Okay.

And reading all of the inferences so if you

eep deducting and paying the premiums it can
Now why there isn't a letter stating so for the

You filled out a health statement?
We did it a long time ago.
We don't administer the plan.
You know what, I'm going to transfer
you to another number that may be able to
help you and hopefully they can.

If

they can't, you know, feel free to call
be back and we'll research it further to
see if we can help you.
Takes a name, takes a number, that's the end.
I just, I'm not seeing what you're telling me is
!

m sorry.

MR. PARKINSON:

Well, I think that when you a
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1

construe all of the facts in the light most favorable to the

2

non-moving party when you read that first paragraph that you

3

started

on—

4

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative)—

5

MR. PARKINSON:

—

where he says but personnel

told me that you can continue insurance on your spouse even
if you get divorced, he's putting himself in the place of you
when he's stating that.
9

I think that's, I think that's clear

from the, from the context, and at least it meets the

10

requirement of creating an issue of fact.

11

argue that he's talking about her continuing the, that she's

12

the you here a, that's continuing the policy after the

13

divorce, and I think that a, they can make that argument.

14

But it's a factual argument, it's not a matter of law.

15

think the, that it creates issues of fact that need to be

16

decided by the fact-finder.

17

THE JUDGE:

If they want to

I

Well, do you think Perkins to that

18

extent was overturned by Youngblood?

Do you think Perkins

19

tells me a, that the Youngblood principle, or excuse me, do

20

you think the Youngblood tells me that the Perkins principle

21

that a, a representation about a contract not, not a

22

contract being purchased, but a contract in existence which

23

is either in the position of or readily available to the

24

insured, that the terms of that contract can actually be

25

modified by the representations of an agent?

That's it's
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1

reasonable for an insured to rely upon the statements of the

2

agent when that contract is in existence and is readily

3

available, and your position is that Youngblood changes

4

that?

5

MR. PARKINSON:

6

THE JUDGE:

7

MR. PARKINSON:

8
9

Paragraph 35 and 36,,. 3 6 —

Okay.
—

says in the second Youngblood

that,
The law holds insurance agents to

10

accurately representing policy provisions

11

and honestly answering consumer

12

questions.

13

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

14

MR. PARKINSON:

15

trained to act in complete honesty and

16

integrity in their interactions with a

17

consumer, or who simply refuse to do so,

18

place themselves and their principals at

19

risk.

20

THE JUDGE:

21

MR. PARKINSON:

22

principal and agent liable for

23

misrepresentations upon which consumers

24

reasonably rely.

25

THE JUDGE:

Agents who are not

Yes, a n d —
The law will hold both

I guess the concern I have here is I
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1

think you have to take that paragraph in the context of the

2

Youngblood case.

3

Youngblood case was an agent who was selling the insurance

4

and was causing the insured to become insured.

5

really a different person than Mrs. Daly (phonetic).

6

Ms. Daly (phonetic) isn't a person that's selling insurance,

7

isn't trying to convince him to join up, isn't telling him

8

what he will get if he pays, she's not creating the contract

9

on behalf of the company.

10
11

When it says agent, the agent in the

That's

It's really a different

relationship, isn't it?
MR. PARKINSON:

I don't think so.

Because this is

12

really he wants to know what do I do to a, to preserve this

13

policy after a divorce, and he talks to the county who has

14

never provided him with a policy who has, who according to

15

the contract has a duty to tell him of the conversion

16

privilege and the, and the testimony is that they haven't

17

informed him of the conversion privilege.

18

then he, he calls Hartford and talks to two separate

19

individuals about what he's supposed to do a, and he's

20

told all you need to do is continue paying on the policy.

21

And, and it is really in effect an entirely new policy.

22

Who a...

And

And I, and the court in Youngblood, the Supreme

23

Court in Youngblood did take away that distinction between

24

the equitable estoppel and the promissory estoppel and

25

there's just estoppel.
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1

THE JUDGE:

Now, it seems to me, and if I

2

remember the facts incorrectly please correct me, but the

3

representation is that the county has a written policy a,

4

regarding these insurance contracts that they are available

5

upon request.

6

there's no evidence from anyone that Mr. Ellison every asked

7

for or made an attempt to look at that written policy.

8

that accurate?

9

And I, as I recall there's no testimony,

MR. PARKINSON:

Is

I have no recollection, and I, I

10

do not believe that the county had a policy that they're, had

11

a written policy that they're available upon request.

12

they do maybe Ms. Van Orman can show you that.

13

recall that.

14

If

I do not

I do know that he didn't have a policy.

This was

15

a fairly recent changeover from Company A to Company B within

16

at least the last year.

17

I do know that they do have these benefit fairs

18

that county employees can go to a, where they can wander

19

through and, and pick up things that are available, so to

20

that extent a, there may have been a benefit there at which

21

he could have wandered through and picked up something.

22

I don't believe there's any testimony that a policy was

23

available at that benefits fair or that he was informed that

24

he had the right to ask for the policy at any time.

25

But

He went and called the county, asked what he
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1

should do, he wanted to get further a, h a '\-":Qc] to

2

strengthen that, he called Hartford and talked with two

3

separate people.

4

Hartford.

5

wrong department.

6

how this whole thing is so intertwined and you, I really

7

think the county and Hartford both need to stay in this

8

because they, they are so at this timely intertwined in this

9

case that a, letting go one of them where they're kind of

And he got the number that he got from

Now they're, Hartford is claiming this is the
Again that kind of, again it just shows

10

pointing fingers at the other, the county is saying, you

11

know, Hartford is the one that makes these decisions, not us,

12

and a, Hartford is saying the county is the one who is

13

responsible for sharing this information.

14

THE JUDGE:

So to recap, your theory of damages is

15

that not only was there a contract created by the, by the

16

conduct of the both county and Hartford agents, it was a

17

contract that continued the insurance coverage and

18

transferred and created a designation of beneficiary to be

19

Mr. Ellison.

20
21
22

MR. PARKINSON:

That's correct.

That's

correct.
And the information with respect to the discussion

23

with Ms. Ellison is admissible.

24

know if I've talked about this or not, it would certainly be

25

a statement against her, her pecuniary interests and would be

It would be, and I don't
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1

the type of a, would meet one of the exceptions to the

2

hearsay rule and is admissible in this case.
THE JUDGE:

3
4

Well, and you think that those facts

would satisfy the clear and convincing standard for fraud?

5

MR. PARKINSON:

I think those facts at the very

6

least present a question of fact.

7

a, a layperson about this case, somebody who has gone to

8

three separate people in authority and he had reasons to

9

believe, I believe that applying this Youngblood case they'll

I bhink when you talk with

10

say that he did what was reasonable in the case.

11

that a j u r y —
THE JUDGE:

12

I believe

Well, I mean, you've got a two step

13

problem with the two, at least two of those

14

representations.

15

reasonableness of Mr. Ellison's actions then what he heard or

16

what he thought he heard is relevant to how he acted.

17

you've also got to prove that the representations were in

18

fact made.

19

evidence.

If we're going to look at the

But

And you have to prove that by competent
And it can't be hearsay.

20

So what have you got outside Mr. Ellison's hearsay

21

declarations that somebody told me that to establish that in

22

fact those other two representations were made?
MR. PARKINSON:

23
24

opponent in both cases.

25

cases.

Statements of the party, party
Statements against interest in both
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1

THE JUDGE:

By whom?

2

MR. PARKINSON:

By the county personnel and a, by

3

Ms. Daly (phonetic) and by the other person at Hartford that

4

a—
THE JUDGE:

5
6

Well, they deny that they ever

occurred.
MR. PARKINSON:

7

—

he spoke with.

And this is

8

a... And also Ms. Daly's (phonetic) conversation is a

9

business record kept in the ordinary—
THE JUDGE:

10

Ms. Daly's (phonetic) conversation

11

we've got a transcript of that, you know, I don't have a

12

problem w i t h —
MR. PARKINSON:

13
14
15

Kept in the ordinary course of

business.
THE JUDGE:

Yes.

I'm talking about the

16

conversation with the unidentified person at the county and

17

the telephone conversation, the subsequent telephone

18

conversation with the unidentified person at Hartford—

19

MR. PARKINSON:

20

THE JUDGE:

—

Uh-huh (affirmative).
both of which Mr. Ellison is the

21

only, only person who can tell us about it.

22

that an 804 because the a, the witness, the declarant is

23

unavailable.

24

MR. PARKINSON:

25

THE JUDGE:

And so isn't

Yes.

Yes.
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MR. PARKINSON:

1
2

interest and it's a , —

3

THE JUDGE:

4

MR. PARKINSON:

5
6

And it's statements against their

It's not former testimony, statements.
And their admissions of a, of a

party.
THE JUDGE:

Well, the statement which at the time

7

of its making was so far contrary to the defendant's

8

pecuniary or proprietary interest or so far tended to subject

9

the declarant to civil liability, or to render invalid a

10

claim that a reasonable person would have not have made the

11

statement unless believing it to be true.

12

MR. PARKINSON:

Well isn't that, I mean, it's so

13

far that they've a, that they've certainly fought this case

14

thus far and they a plan to continue fighting it, if the

15

court denies their motions for summary judgment, it s e e m s —

16

THE JUDGE:

What's, what's the statement that,

17

that you can, that it's possible to continue insurance?

18

They don't deny that.

19

MR. PARKINSON:

I don't think the statement is...

20

I think if you look at it again the plain reading of what a,

21

of what people say, you know, they say, you know, if you keep

22

her on there that's fine.

23

understanding is as long as you keep paying her, paying for

24

her you're able to a, keep her on the contract, you're able

25

to keep her on the insurance, and you're able to recover it.

I think that the plain
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1

I mean, they were not, there is no, it's not a formalized

2

contract, you know, with a wherefor, couple of wherefor

3

clauses at the beginning and that sort of thing.

4

they are the types of statements that are, that a layperson

5

would reasonably rely on.

But I think

I should state that the county did, did know prior

6
7

to the passing of this period that a, that Mr. Ellison had,

8

had filed for divorce.

9

up issues a , —
THE JUDGE:

10

I think also just kind of on a, clean

Well I can, I can take judicial notice

1 1 that all kinds of people file for divorce and don't get a
12

divorce.

So knowing that they filed for divorce doesn't

13

really get us anywhere, does it?
MR. PARKINSON:

14

Yes.

But there was a, there was

15

an email about the continuation of health insurance policy

16

after the divorce so I think it was more than just knowing

17

that—

18

THE JUDGE:

19

MR. PARKINSON:

20

THE JUDGE:

21

have made the calls.

22

He clearly k n e w —

—

MR. PARKINSON:

—

they filed for divorce.

there was a problem or he wouldn't

Yes.

He made, he made the calls

23

to try to figure out what to do.

And I think that was

24

reasonable for him to do during the a, during the process.

25

I think Ms. Daly's (phonetic) statement of that,
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1

that's fine is a reasonable ratification statement for a

2

layperson.

The other statements a, I've mentioned.
And I think, you know, the idea that they can make

3
4

these deceptively half true statements and then hide behind

5

the other aspect of the truth I don't; I don't think that's
fair in this context.
THE JUDGE:

You think what Ms. Daly (phonetic)

said was deceptive, h o w —
MR. PARKINSON:

9

Well if...

I don't think it was,

10

no.

11

they are trying to turn it to be deceptively half true.

12

Yes, you can continue it.

13

statement is that a, if you go ahead and fill out all these

14

papers and, and complete this process.

15

to say that that i s —
THE JUDGE:

16
17

I don't think it was deceptively half true.

I think

And then the unspoken part of the

And they are trying

Didn't she send him on to somebody to

get that done and say if it doesn't work out call me back?
MR. PARKINSON:

18

She sent him on not to get that

19

done, she just sent him on to get another confirmation.

20

mean, that's not what she's saying I'm sending you on to a —

21

THE JUDGE:

22

MR. PARKINSON:

23

I

Okay.
—

get some paperwork to fill

out.

24

Thank you.

25

THE JUDGE:

Okay.
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FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MS. VAN ORMAN

1

MS. VAN ORMAN:

2

I'll be very brief, Your Honor.

3

There's two issues that I think would be helpful for a

4

clarification to the court.
Regarding the alleged conversation with a, the

5
6

county one thing counsel has mentioned he keeps referring to

7

as a telephone conversation.

8

testimony.

He said that he went to the offices and spoke to

9

somebody.

We don't know where that was, we don't know if it

10

was in the hall.

It was not a direct phone c a l l —

11

THE JUDGE:

12

MS. VAN ORMAN:

13

I don't think that was the

Uh-huh (affirmative).
—

to the personnel department.

But I thought it would be helpful for the court t o —
THE JUDGE:

14

Yes.

I thought, I thought the second

15

of the two conversations to the anonymous person was

16

telephone.
MS. VAN ORMAN:

17
18

And that was to

Hartford.

19

THE JUDGE:

20

MS. VAN ORMAN:

21

Correct.

Hartford.
Right.

What might be helpful for

the court is a little bit of a time frame on this.

22

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

23

MS. VAN ORMAN:

The first conversation with

24

Ms. Daly (phonetic) a, according to an affidavit from Nancy

25

Burlindy (phonetic) at Hartford, and I believe that was
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1

submitted as an exhibit, that conversation occurred

2

January 30th, 2002.

3

or excuse me, August of 2003.

4

October of 2003.

5

where Mr. Ellison came to the county.

6

had some kind of a conversation at the county with whomever

7

he had that conversation with, this was not anywhere near in

8

time to when the divorce occurred.

9

The divorce occurred October of 2003,
And Ms. Ellison passed away

So we're not talking about a situation
And apparently if he

This, there, there is no evidence, there's no

10

allegation, there's nothing that Mr. Ellison ever came to the

11

county and said I've had a divorce, or I've filed for

12

divorce, it's pending, I have a life insurance policy, what

13

do I do, let's sit down, who do I talk to, who is the person

14

that I can talk to see what we can do.

15

allegations that anything like that ever occurred.

16

There's no

What he alleges, and this is just so farfetched,

17

but somehow some time prior to January 30th of 2002, so we're

18

talking about over a year and a half prior, he somehow goes

19

to the county, talks to somebody, we don't know what date, we

20

don't know who he spoke with, and he says whatever he says

21

that somehow they told him yes, all you have to do is

22

continue paying your premiums.

23

needed to provide to the county was look, here's my divorce

24

decree, or I've filed for divorce or something.

25

no allegations that anything like that ever happened.

But the notice that he

But there's
This
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i c ysst
2

sc~e

kir.f cf a conversation soir.e^iers.

And I think it, Your Honor, you were very

3

perceptive when you talked about a, what exception to the

4

hearsay rule are we talking about here.

5

declarant unavailable.

6

thing.

7

some conversation with somebody who happened to be in the

8

Utah County personnel building a year and a half prior.

9

mean, that is so far off I just don't see where there's any

804 with the

Who is the declarant?

That's the

We need an identity, we need something other than

I

10

evidence to, to substantiate any kind of a conversation to

11

prove that to therefore trigger the duty on the part of the

12

county.

13

I thought the other information, Your Honor, that

14

would be a, informative for Your Honor is a, the fact

15

regarding the insurance policy being made available to

16

Mr. Ellison.

17

was provided, on page 13 of his deposition he was asked,

18

In Mr. Ellison's deposition, and I believe this

Is it possible that at one of the

19

benefit fairs you attended at the county

20

that there were written materials

21

available on the Hartford life insurance

22

policy?

23

His answer:

24

He says:

25

There may have been.

Yes, I suppose it's

possible.
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1

Question:

Is it also possible that at

2

one of those benefits fair you were

3

provided a copy of the Hartford life

4

insurance policy?

5

He says:

6

How do you know that?

7

Well, if I would have received a copy I

8
9

No.

would have had it in my files.
So you keep all the copies of all of

10

the health insurance information and the

11

other information provided to you at the

12

benefits fair?

13

Yes.

14

And you currently have that for as long

15

as you've been employed?

16

He said:

17

each year.

They give you new materials

18

So you throw away the old ones?

19

He said:

Except for life insurance.

20

He said:

I do keep several years of

21
22

health insurance.
And he was asked:

Do you believe you

23

would have asked anyone at Utah County in

24

the personal department for a copy of the

25

Hartford life insurance policy that they
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1

would have given you a copy?

2

And he said:

3

He says:

4

or wouldn't?

5

He says:

6

We asked:

Yes.

You don't know if they would

I don't know, ya.
Do you have any evidence

7

that we could objectively look at that

8

would say to a reasonable person that the

9

county would not have given you a copy of

10

the policy?

11

He says:

12

They that, they had the insurance fairs, the health

No.

13

fairs, the policy materials were made available there.

14

think that the county people have testified to that.

15

would have ever asked he would have been provided a copy.

16

Also those fairs are mandatory that the employees have to

17

attend, they can't get out of attending those fairs.

18

think that any kind of argument that he wasn't given a copy

19

of the policy, there's never been any kind of an allegation

20

that he ask for one and wasn't given it.

21

THE JUDGE:

22

MS. VAN ORMAN:

23
24
25

Okay.

I
If he

So I

Thank you.

Thank you.

FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. CHRISTIANSEN
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

One last tiny point, because I

think we've covered the ground.
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I just v.T-ited to remind you of two cases,
2

Your Honor.

The Pack versus Case case and the Rodowitz

3

(phonetic) versus Massachusetts case.

4

cases say that for estoppel or modification the alleged

5

representation must be a specific and definite statement.

And both of those

And the reason I think that's important is

6

because

7

of the line of questioning Your Honor was doing which was

8

show me the representation where he can continue as a

9

beneficiary.

10

There's no representation in the record that

he would continue as a beneficiary of the converted policy.

1 1 And I think taking the Pack versus Case case and the Rodowitz
12

(phonetic) versus Massachusetts case which requires a

13

specific and definite statement it's not here, it's a missing

14

piece of evidence.
Thanks, Your Honor.

15

COURT'S RULING

16
THE JUDGE:

17

I, I think I know how I want to rule

18

and a, candidly I'm inclined to rule now.

19

office next week.

20

going to have to refigure this all out again.

21

goes.

22

I'm out of the

If I wait two weeks to write this I'm
So here

First of all, I do not find that there's credible

23

evidence to support either the first conversation with an

24

unidentified county employee or a second conversation with

25

someone at the Hartford company.

The only evidence to
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1

here.

2

Mr. Ellison to ignore the plain language of the contract in

3

favor of whatever he thought he had heard from Ms. Daly

4

(phonetic).

5

I don't think it would have been reasonable for

There's no, there's no evidence of fraud because

6

there was no evidence of a misrepresentation to an existing

7

fact, there's no evidence that there was reasonable reliance

8

and there's no evidence of damages.

9

And similarly with regard to estoppel there's no

10

evidence of reasonable reliance, there's no evidence of a

11

misrepresentation by an appropriate agent, and most

12

critically there's no evidence of damages.

13
14
15
16
17
18

So I'm going to grant the summary judgment for both
the county and for the insurance company on those bases.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:
prepare that?
THE JUDGE:

Yes.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

20

THE JUDGE:

22

I think it would be very helpful

if you would.

19

21

Would you like that, us to

Thank you.

Thank you very much.

briefed, very well argued.

Very well

Thanks to all of you.

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.

23
24
25
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STATE OF UTAH
3
COUNTY OF UTAH
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5
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6
7
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8
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9

the matter of Ellison vs. Utah County, et al, hearing date

in

10
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11

that a full, true and correct transcription of said hearing

12
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13
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APPENDIX B
SIGNED ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS DATED
JANUARY 22,2008

i r r te&***v

m 13

ERIK A. CHRISTIANSEN (7372)
JEFFREY J. DROUBAY (9119)
Parsons Behle & Latimer
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111
Attorneys for Hartford Life And Accident
Insurance Company

*

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
VAL M. ELLISON,

[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF DEFENDANTS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 050402012
UTAH COUNTY GOVERNMENT and
HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Connecticut
Corporation,

Judge: Hon. James R. Taylor
Division #7

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
1.

On July 20, 2007, the Court heard oral argument on Defendant Hartford Life and

Accident Insurance Company's ("Hartford") Motion for Summary Judgment and on Defendant
Utah County Government's ("Utah County") Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Val M.
Ellison was represented by Kenneth Parkinson of Howard Lewis & Petersen.

Defendant

Hartford was represented by Erik A. Christiansen of Parsons Behle & Latimer. Defendant Utah

6
1001460 1

County was represented by Kristin A. VanOrman of Strong and Haoni. After careful review of
the briefs, all admissible evidence and oral argument the Court hereby rules and orders as
follows:
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2.

Mr. Ellison's claims center around his contention that he is entitled to life

insurance proceeds under an employee life insurance plan offered by Utah County ("the Plan"),
his employer. The undisputed facts are that the Plan was offered by Utah County to its eligible
employees and was funded by a group life insurance policy issued by Hartford to Utah County.
The Plan permitted eligible Utah County employees to elect dependent life insurance coverage
for their dependents. The Policy defines "Dependent" as "Your spouse" and "Your unmarried
child."

The Policy also states that dependent coverage terminates on the date when, "the

Dependent no longer meets the definition of Dependent." A dependent whose coverage ends
because he/she ceases to meet the definition of "Dependent" has the option under the Policy to
convert his/her dependent coverage into a conversion policy. The Policy explains,
How does an individual convert coverage?
To convert life insurance, the individual must, within 31 days of
the date group coverage terminates, make written application to Us
and pay the premium for his age and class of risk.
3.

It is undisputed that in about 1998, Mr. Ellison elected dependent life insurance

coverage for Sherrie Ellison, his wife at that time. In 2001, Sherrie Ellison was diagnosed with
pancreatic cancer, a condition that was terminal. During the period of her illness, Sherrie Ellison
initiated divorce proceedings against Mr. Ellison.
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On August 21, 2003, the divorce was

finalized. Sherrie Ellison died on October 19, 2003. She never converted her group dependent
life insurance coverage into an individual policy.
4.

It also is undisputed that after Sherrie Ellison's death, Mr. Ellison made a claim

for life insurance proceeds to Hartford. Hartford denied the claim on the grounds that Sherrie
Ellison ceased to be eligible for dependent life insurance coverage after her divorce from Mr.
Ellison, because she no longer met the definition of "Dependent."
5.

Mr. Ellison claims, however, that prior to his and Sherrie Ellison's divorce, he

had a conversation with someone at Utah County and that he believed that he spoke with two
Hartford representatives wherein he was told that life insurance coverage for Sherrie Ellison
could continue subsequent to their divorce.

Mr. Ellison specifically identified in his

interrogatory responses a call on January 30, 2003, and testified during his deposition that he was
transferred to a second Hartford representative during that call. Mr. Ellison does not know the
identity of the alleged other employee with whom he claims he spoke. Hartford has produced in
discovery a recording of a single telephone conversation Mr. Ellison had with one of its
representatives, Linda Daly.
6.

Both plaintiffs and defendant's phone records revealed only one telephone call

from plaintiff to Hartford. During that recorded phone call, Ellison spoke with Ms. Daly of
Hartford's Medical Underwriting area. In that phone call with Ms. Daly, Ellison stated that Utah
County informed him that he could continue insurance on his spouse, even if he and his wife
divorced. He asked Ms. Daly if this was accurate. Ms. Daly responded,
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I believe so yes. . . . I d o n ' t . . . I haven't heard anything as to why,
I think that's your option if you want to . . . They're going to be
payroll deducting for her so if you want to keep her on there, that's
fine.
7.

Ellison next told Ms. Daly that he needed a letter for the court. Ms. Daly asked if

he had filled out a personal health statement, and he said that he had. Ms. Daly then responded:
I'm trying to think who would be . . . we're in the medical
underwriting area and what we do is we simply underwrite the
application, we really, we don't administer the plan, . . . Did your
benefits or HR department tell you to call us?
8.

Ellison responded his HR department had told him to call Hartford and said again

that he needed something in writing. At that point, Ms. Daly responded:
You know what, I'm going to transfer you to another number that
may be able to help you and hopefully they can, if they cannot,
you know, feel free to call me back and we'll reseairch it further to
see who can help you.
At this point, Mr. Ellison asked for Ms. Daly's name to write down. She spelled her name for
him and gave him another number to call.
9.

According to the transcript, the call then terminated. There is no evidence on the

transcript that Mr. Ellison was transferred to another person or number. The transcript also
reveals that Mr. Ellison did not ask Ms. Daly what he needed to do, e.g. complete paperwork or
otherwise, in order to effect the continuation of coverage on his ex-wife.
10.

Neither Hartford, Utah County, nor Ellison has any documentary record or

recording of any second phone call to Hartford.
11.

At no time, as admitted by Mr. Ellison, did Mr. Ellison ask for or obtain a copy of

the Policy.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
12.

Summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is

appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Utah. R. Civ. Pro. 56(b). All inferences that reasonably can be drawn from the facts should be
drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Ho v. Jim's Enter., Inc., 29 P.3d 633, 634 (Utah
2001); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The party opposing summary
judgment has the duty to "set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." DLB
Collection Trust by Helgesen & Waterfall v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e)). "[B]are contentions unsupported by any specification of facts in support
thereof, raise no material questions of fact as will preclude entry of summary judgment." Massey
v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980). Moreover, a party opposing summary
judgment must do so with admissible evidence. Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr., Inc., 101
P.3d 371, 377 (Utah App. 2004).
13.

As set forth in the pleadings and the undisputed admissible evidence before the

Court, the Court holds that Mr. Ellison's claim for breach of contract against Hartford and Utah
County fails as a matter of law because Sherrie Ellison was not covered by the Policy's
unambiguous dependent coverage provisions once she divorced Mr. Ellison and no longer met
the Policy's definition of "Dependent." See Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., 814 P.2d
1125, 1129 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist,
773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989) and Draughon v. CUNA Mutual Ins. Soc'y, 111 P.2d 1105,
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1108 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)) (stating that when interpreting an insurance policy, Utah courts look
to the "four corners of the agreement" to determine the intent of the parties, and if that intent is
clear and unambiguous, the court will give effect to it).
14.

As set forth in the pleadings and undisputed admissible evidence before the Court,

the Court also holds that Ellison's breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim
against Hartford fails as a matter of law because, in the insurance context, such a claim cannot be
maintained if the insurer denied a claim that was "fairly debatable." Prince v. Bear River Mut.
Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 533 (Utah 2002) (citing Morris v. Health Net of Calif, Inc., 988 P.2d 940
(Utah 1999); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1996); Callioux v.
Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). The Policy states that dependent
life insurance coverage ends on the date a dependent ceases to meet the Policy's definition of
"Dependent." Sherrie Ellison ceased to meet the Policy's definition of "Dependent" when her
divorce from Mr. Ellison became final. For this reason, the Court concludes that Hartford's
denial of Mr. Ellison's claim on these grounds is "fairly debatable."
15.

Based on the pleadings before the Court and the undisputed admissible facts

before the Court, the Court concludes that Mr. Ellison's fraud claim against Utah County and
Hartford fails as a matter of law for multiple and independent reasons as set forth herein:
16.

A party asserting a fraud claim bears the burden of proving each of the elements

of that claim by clear and convincing evidence. Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524,
536 (Utah 2002) (quoting Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198
(2001)).
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17.

Mr. Ellison's fraud claim fails because there is no admissible evidence that he

reasonably relied upon the statements of Ms. Daly. The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that
any reasonable person, after speaking to Ms. Daly, would have investigated further, obtained
further paperwork, including a copy of the policy, and/or come back to Ms. Daly for more
information. A reasonable person would not have done nothing, as Mr. Ellison admitted he did
in this case.
18.

Based on the undisputed facts and admissible evidence before the Court, the

Court further concludes that there is no admissible evidence to support Mr. Ellison's assertion of
a conversation with an unknown and unidentifiable Utah County employee regarding the
continuation of life insurance benefits for Sherrie Ellison. Similarly, there is no admissible
evidence to support Mr. Ellison's assertion of a separate conversation with an unknown and
unidentifiable employee at Hartford.
19.

The Court finds that, in the absence of any admissible evidence, Mr. Ellison's

representations regarding his alleged communications with Hartford and Utah County are
unreliable, inadmissible, and cannot be taken as a sufficient evidentiary and factual basis to
establish the fact of or the content of those alleged conversations with unknown and
unidentifiable persons.
20.

Further, the only conversation that is documented, Mr. Ellison's January 30, 2002

conversation with Linda Daly of Hartford, is insufficient to establish reasonable reliance and
extend the express terms of the life insurance policy.
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21.

The Court also concludes separately and independently that there was no

reasonable reliance by Mr. Ellison as a matter of law because Perkins v. Great-West Life
Assurance Co., 814 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) controls the analysis of this issue. In
Perkins, the Utah Court of Appeals held that an insured's reliance upon the post-contract
representations of the insurers agent is not reasonable when those representations contradict the
plain terms of the insurance policy and the insured has access to that policy. Id. at 1130; see also
Internet Law Library, Inc. v. Southridge Capital Management, LLC, 223 F. Supp.2d 474, 485
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that reliance is unreasonable "as a matter of law" "where the statements
relied upon are explicitly contradicted by a written agreement between the parties involved.");
Govt. Computer Sales, Inc. v. Dell Marketing, L.R, No. F04-0030 CV (RRB), 2005 WL
1713182 *3 (Alaska 2005) ("Plaintiff could not reasonably have relied on representations so
clearly inconsistent with its written contract and agreements."); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v
Spraggins, 853 So.2d 913, 916 (Ala. 2002) ("[A] party cannot reasonably rely on such a
statement when the written . . . agreement signed by them clearly contradicts any such alleged
statement." (citations omitted)). Because Mr. Ellison, with reasonable diligence, could have
obtained a copy of his policy and discovered the requirements of the conversion provisions, his
reliance on post-contract representations, if any, was unreasonable as a matter of law.
22.

The Court also finds that no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the

transcript of the recording of the Daly call manifests an intent by Ms. Daly to deceive or
misrepresent a fact. Thus, Mr. Ellison's fraud claim fails for this separate and independent
reason as well.
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23.

The Court also finds that there was no misrepresentation regarding in existing

material fact in this case, and that Mr. Ellison's fraud claim also fails for this separate and
independent reason.

"fArf—mi^yepresentatiro^r—of intended future

pcrformaftee—4s~-ne£—a-
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£p:fe^-4h^pF^^
k&upr-feer-wr -W&¥h&e&?S!€m>prr^^

Ct. App. 1994)-

(citing CcvrUos Truckm^Qo-, v Utah Venture No J, ,64&^2d 608, 611 (Utah 1982^—:Eh^

mnot^upport44rr4^
24.

The Court finds that Mr. Ellison's fraud claim fails separately and independently

as a matter of law because there is no admissible evidence of damages. Specifically, there is no
connection between Mr. Ellison's alleged loss and his claimed damages in this case. There is no
admissible evidence from which the fact-finder can reasonably infer that Sheme Ellison would
have converted her group insurance policy into an individual policy, and there is no evidence that
Mr. Ellison, rather than Sherrie Ellison's estate or heirs, would have been the beneficiaries of
that conversion policy.
25.

Mr. Ellison's estoppel claim against Hartford fails for many of the same reasons

that his fraud claim fails as set forth herein:
26.
reliance.

1001460 1

First, to establish a claim of estoppel, a plaintiff must demonstrate reasonable
As discussed above, Mr. Ellison's reliance was not reasonable as a matter of
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undisputed fact or law. See Perkins, 814 P.2d 1125; Internet Law Library, 223 F. Supp. 2d 474;
Govt Computer Sales, No. F04-0030 CV (RRB), 2005 WL 1713182; Jim Walter Homes, 853
So. 2d 913.
27.

Second, for the reasons set forth above, there is no admissible evidence of any

misrepresentation by an employee of Hartford. Similarly, there is no admissible evidence of any
misrepresentation by an employee of Hartford who had legal authority to bind Hartford. The
representations of an employee are not binding upon a company unless those representations
concern a matter made within the scope of the employee's agency. See Wayment v. Clear
Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 116 P.3d 271, 287 (Utah 2005).

Based on the undisputed

admissible facts before the Court, that is not the case here.
28.

Finally, and most of all, for the reasons set forth above, there is no admissible

evidence of damages to give rise to a claim of estoppel.
29.

Mr. Ellison's negligence claim against Utah County fails as a matter of law

because, as discussed above, there is no admissible evidence of any conversation between Mr.
Ellison and Utah County wherein the County negligently represented to Mr. Ellison that life
insurance coverage for Sherrie Ellison would continue after their divorce.
30.

Mr. Ellison's negligence claim also fails because it is premised primarily upon

Utah County's alleged failure to inform him of the Policy provisions and procedures, particularly
the Policy's conversion procedures.

However, Mr. Ellison could have, with reasonable

diligence, obtained a copy of the Policy and informed himself regarding the Policy's provisions
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and procedures Mr Ellison, however, admits that he took no steps to obtain a copy of the Policy
during the releyant time period.
GRANTING OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
31.

For all of the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Mr. Ellison has

failed to present any genuine factual disputes sufficient to forestall summary judgment in favor
of Defendants under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court therefore finds
that all of Plaintiffs claims fail as a matter of law, and are hereby dismisggd, with prejudice.
32.

The Court hereby grants summary judgment in f^^^£^mtf^i^^d

Utah County

on all of Plaintiff s claims, all of which are hereby dismissed,
DATED this <9<£ day of

S/^~

200^

Approved as to form:

Kenneth Parkinson
Counsel for Plaintiff

Kristin A. Van Orman
Counsel for Utah County Government
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APPENDIX C
TELEPHONE TRANSCRIPT OF ELLISON PHONE
CALL WITH HARTFORD INSURANCE

TRANSCRIPTION OF ELLISON PHONE CALL
Daly:

Medical Underwriting, this is Linda, how can I help you?

Ellison:

Hi Linda, Val Ellison calling, from uh Utah.

Daly:

Okay.

Ellison:

Where are you guys at?

Daley:

Connecticut.

Ellison:

Connecticut? Okay, I guess so, Hartford, right?

Daly.

Yeah,

Ellison:

Um, I guess, uh, I work for Utah County Government.

Daly:

Okay.

Ellison:

And so you guys apparently have taken over for our life insurance, for this year.
And My wife and I are getting a divorce, but personnel told me that you can
continue insurance on your spouse even if you get divorced, is this accurate?

Daly:

I believe so yes. I don't... I haven't heard anything as to why. I think that's your
option if you want to and you continue to ... they're going to be payroll deducting
for her so if you want to keep her on there, that's fine.

Ellison:

Now, uh, what I will need then is just a letter stating so for the court, saying that it
is possible and then I will tell them that I will continue it.

Daly:

What did ... Have you filled out a personal health statement yet, or no?

Ellison:

Well, yeah, from way back, ya know. I've been with the County for a long time so
it's just been coming out of my payroll forever but it changes life insurance
company from year to year ... or maybe every couple years ... so yeah, we did, a
long time ago.

Daly:

I'm trying to think who would be ... we're in the medical underwriting area and
what we do is we simply underwrite the application - we really, we don't
administer the plan.

Ellison:

Okay.

Daly:

So, did your benefits or you HR department tell you to call us?
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Ellison:

They did. They gave me your phone number, they said, yes it is true that it can
continue, but I said I needed something in writing, and they said, well, call the
insurance company.

Daly:

You know what, I'm going to transfer you to another number that may be able to
help you, um, and hopefully they can. If they cannot, you know, feel free to call
me back and we'll research it further to see who can help you ...

Ellison:

Okay, let me write down your name again...

Daly:

Okay.

Ellison:

What was it...

Daly:

Linda and my last name is Daly, D-A-L-Y. The number I'm going to give you,
I'm not sure if anybody's going to be there because it's 6:00 here and you came in
right before the phones get shut off.

Ellison:

Gotcha, okay.

Daley

So the number is 1-800-523-2233 and they're more on the administrative side of
it, the billing side, so they may be able to help you. If they can't, you can call me
back and my number is 1-800-331-7234 and I'll give you my extension, which is
39642, and I'll try to research it here and see what I can find out if they're unable
to help you. And again, the same thing stands for here, though our phone gets
shut off at 6:00, so I don't know if you'll be able to get back in.

Ellison:

Good.

Daly:

Okay.

Ellison

Thank you Linda.

Daly:

You're welcome.

Ellison:

Bye.

Daly:

Bye, bye.
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